CAUSATION AND ATTENUATION
IN THE SLAVERY REPARATIONS DEBATE
Kaimipono David Wenger*
Recent discussions of reparations have noted the difficulty
reparations advocates have in showing causation. Criticisms of
reparations have focused on the attenuated nature of the harm,
suggesting that modern claimants are not connected to slaves, that
modern payers are not connected to slave owners, and that modern
disadvantages cannot be connected to slavery.
This Article examines attenuation concerns and finds that they
come in three related but distinct varieties: Victim attenuation,
wrongdoer attenuation, and act attenuation. These three components,
defined in this Article, show themselves in a number of interrelated
legal and moral arguments.
They have important strategic
consequences, and operate together to create a formidable obstacle
for reparations.
This Article then discusses how ideas on causation from the mass
tort context can address legal problems of attenuation in reparations.
Mass tort cases have developed novel methods of showing causation,
such as statistical evidence, and these tools can be used in the
reparations context. By using the tools of mass torts, it is possible for
reparations advocates to show causation.
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The case for slavery reparations is failing. Scholars continue to
write about reparations,1 but they increasingly seem to be the only
ones on the bandwagon. The media is sometimes ambivalent and
occasionally hostile.2 The lukewarm media reception mirrors societal
feelings in general.3 Reparations claims have failed in the courts,4 and
1

See generally Kaimipono David Wenger, Slavery as a Takings Clause
Violation, 53 Am. U. L. Rev. 191, 193 nn. 4-5 (collecting legal scholarship
addressing reparations); Alfred L. Brophy, Reparations Talk: Reparations for Slavery
and the Tort Law Analogy, 24 B.C. Third World L.J. 81, 82-84 (2003) (noting
advances in reparations discussion) [hereinafter Brophy, Reparations Talk]; Alfred
Brophy, Some Conceptual and Legal Problems in Reparations for Slavery, 58 NYU
Ann. Surv. Am. L. 497, 505 (2002) (discussing development of reparations theory)
[hereinafter Brophy, Some Problems].
Some of the major reparations pieces in recent years include Randall
Robinson, The Debt: What America Owes to Blacks (1999); Should America Pay?:
Slavery and the Raging Debate on Reparations (Raymond A. Winbush ed., 2003)
[hereinafter Should America Pay?]; Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical
Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 323 (1987); and
reparations symposia at New York University, see Symposium, A Dream Deferred:
Comparative and Practical Considerations for the Black Reparations Movement, 58
N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 447 (2002), at the University of Memphis, see
Symposium, 33 U. Mem. L. Rev. 245 (2003), and at Boston University, see
Symposium, __ B.U. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2004). Modern legal reparations
literature is generally acknowledged to have begun with professor Boris Bittker’s
work. See Boris Bittker, The Case for Black Reparations (Beacon Press 2003)
(1973).
2
See, e.g., Kevin Merida, Did Freedom Alone Pay a Nation’s Debt?; Rep. John
Conyers Jr. Has a Question, He’s Willing to Wait a Long Time for the Right
Answer, Wash. Post, Nov. 23, 1999, at C-01; see also Vincene Verdun, If the Shoe
Fits, Wear It: An Analysis of Reparations to African Americans, 67 Tul. L. Rev.
597, 607 n.29 (collecting media accounts); Wenger, supra note 1, at 195 nn. 6-7
(same).
3
Polls show that overwhelming majorities of whites oppose reparations, while
Blacks support reparations. See Michael Kranish, Blacks Rally on Capital for
Slavery Reparations: Farrakhan Seeks Transfer of Land, Boston Globe, Aug. 18
2002, at A3 (discussing these findings from the CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll);
Alfred Brophy, The Cultural War Over Reparations for Slavery, 53 DePaul L. Rev.
1181, 1182-85 (discussing statistics) [hereinafter Brophy, Cultural War]; see also
Lee A. Harris, “Reparations” as a Dirty Word: The Norm Against Slavery
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proposed legislation has failed to advance in the legislature.5 A
disjunct exists between scholarly writing and the real world.6 One
source of this disjunct is the difficulty reparations advocates have in
establishing causation. This Article will address the unique problems
of causation and attenuation that arise in the reparations context.
Causation is a familiar concept to legal scholars. Tort liability
requires a showing of proximate causation.7 Claimants must show not
only conceptual “but-for” causation — that “but for” a party’s actions,
the harm would not have occurred — but must also establish legally
actionable “proximate cause.”8 In reparations, the attenuated nature of
the harm makes it difficult to show proximate cause.9
Reparations, 33 U. Mem. L. Rev. 409, 410 n.9 (discussing these and other poll
results). See generally Taunya Lovell Banks, Exploring White Resistance to Racial
Reconciliation in the United States, 55 Rutgers L. Rev. 903, 915-19 (2003)
(discussing demographics of Americans opposed to reparations).
4
See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1108-10 (9th Cir. 1995); In re
African-American Slave Descendants Litigation, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027 (N.D. Ill.
2004).
5
Representative John Conyers (D. Mich.) first introduced a bill in 1989 that
would have established a commission to study the effects of slavery and recommend
appropriate remedies. The bill died in committee, and has been reintroduced (and
repeatedly killed) every Congress since then. See H.R. 3745, 101st Cong. (1989);
H.R. 1684, 102d Cong. (1991); H.R. 40, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R. 891, 104th Cong.
(1995); H.R. 40, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 40, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 40, 107th
Cong. (2001); H.R. 40, 108th Cong. (2003). Representative Conyers has stated, “I
have re-introduced H.R. 40 every Congress since 1989, and will continue to do so
until it’s passed into law.” John Conyers, Jr., Major Issues—Reparations: The
Commission to Study Reparations Proposals for African Americans Act, at
http://www.house.gov/conyers/news_ reparations.htm. See also Verdun, supra note
2, at 606-07 & n. 28 (discussing proposed legislation); Wenger, supra note 1, at 194
n.6 (same).
6
Cf. Brophy, Reparations Talk, supra note 1, at 83-86.
7
See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay
for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 69, 69-72 (1975); Richard W. Wright,
Causation in Tort Law, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1735, 1737-39 (1985).
8
See Elizabeth C. Price, Toward A Unified Theory of Products Liability:
Reviving the Causative Concept of Legal Fault, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 1277, 1347 (1994)
(“‘Cause-in-fact,’ ‘factual cause,’ or ‘but for’ causation, as every first-year law
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Attenuation is diminished or failed causation. It is a failure of
closeness, which can be created by distance, time, or the intervening

student knows, is generally an indispensable requisite to recovery in tort. It is the
first head of the two-headed hydra of causation. The other head . . .is ‘proximate’ or
‘legal’ cause, a policy tool designed to cut off liability for acts perceived as too
remote, attenuated, or mere conditions.”); Kim Forde-Mazrui, Taking Conservatives
Seriously: A Moral Justification for Affirmative Action and Reparations, 92 Cal. L.
Rev. 683, 727 (2003) (“Actual causation is but a starting point for establishing
responsibility, making the causal agent ‘eligible’ for responsibility.”). W. Page
Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 264 (1984) (“As a practical
matter, legal responsibility must be limited to those causes which are so closely
connected with the result and of such significance that the law is justified in
imposing liability.”).
Thus, the law generally treats as actionable those
“consequences which follow in unbroken sequence, without an intervening efficient
cause, from the original negligent act.” See 57A Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 491.
“For such consequences the original wrongdoer is responsible, even though he or she
could not have foreseen the particular results which did follow or results of a similar
nature.” Id.
The problem of attenuation, and its relation to causation, can be illustrated by a
quick example. In a scenario where Martha shoots John in the chest, and he
immediately dies, we may say that there is likely to be a causal chain between her
shot and his death. However, imagine another scenario, where Martha shoots John
in the chest, and he walks away. He then plays basketball the next day; he goes sky
diving and scuba diving; he gets into a car accident. Five days later, John dies. In
the second scenario, the causal chain is far more attenuated. Perhaps we can infer
that Martha’s shot caused John’s eventual death, but there could have been other
factors involved: physical exertion, other trauma, natural causes. The number of
intermediate steps between the initial act and the manifestation of the harm create
attenuation. See also Keeton et al., supra, at 301-08 (discussing intervening causes);
Oscar S. Gray, The Law of Torts 86-87 (1986) (discussing proximate cause).
9
In the words of one critic, reparations advocates point to an injury which is
not “fairly traceable to slavery through a chain that contains no links of independent
causation.” Calvin Massey, Some Thoughts on the Law and Politics of Reparations
for Slavery, 24 B.C. Third World L.J. 157, 166 (2004); see also id. (“I am
contending only that the nexus between slavery and the present forces that produce
the sense of injustice felt by black Americans today is too attenuated to merit a
judicial award of damages based on restitution.”); see infra § I.B. (discussing
attenuation in reparations literature).
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actions of others.10 Attenuation is a conceptual separation between
two actors or events, a dilution or weakening of any connection that
they may have. And because it weakens the connection between two
actors or events, attenuation can sever conceptual but-for causation
from proximate cause.
In this Article, I turn an analytical eye to attenuation arguments
used in the reparations debate, defining and examining different types
of attenuation arguments. Attenuation comes in three types, which I
identify and label for the first time: victim attenuation, wrongdoer
attenuation, and act attenuation. Victim attenuation is found in the
argument that modern Blacks11 have no direct connection to slaves;
wrongdoer attenuation, that modern Americans tend to lack specific
individual connections to slave holders; and act attenuation, that
modern injury to Blacks is unrelated to the harms of slavery.12
In every reparations discussion, the idea of attenuation — often
inchoate, but always present — is a major barrier. Reparations
opponents use the different forms of attenuation in different ways.
And attenuation has important strategic effects. The problem of
attenuation is a serious obstacle for reparations advocates because it
threatens the progress of the litigation and legislation.13 To achieve
10

“The longer the interval between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action, the more attenuated becomes the evidence of the requisite
causation.” Spadola v. New York City Transit Authority, 242 F. Supp. 2d 284, 294
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); see generally 57A Am. Jur. 2d Negligence §§ 465, 491 (1989 &
Supp. 2000) (discussing how temporal factor and an intervening circumstance affect
remoteness and causation analysis).
11
Throughout this Article I will use the term “Black” rather than “black” or
“African-American.” Cf. Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv. L. Rev.
1331, 1332 n.2 (1988) (“I shall use ‘‘African-American’ and ‘Black’
interchangeably. When using ‘Black,’ I shall use an upper-case ‘B’ to reflect my
view that Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and other ‘minorities,’ constitute a specific
cultural group and, as such, require denotation as a proper noun.”).
12
See infra Part I.A. (discussing victim, wrongdoer, and act attenuation).
13
See infra Part I.A. (describing and analyzing various versions of attenuation);
see also Eric J. Miller, Reconceiving Reparations: Multiple Strategies in the
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any success, reparationists must advance both legal and moral
claims.14 Attenuation threatens both of these fronts.
After defining and examining attenuation, I set out to address it.15
This is done in part by using tools developed in the mass tort context.
This Article provides the tools to help reparations advocates approach
attenuation.
Part I discusses and analyzes different types of
attenuation arguments that arise in the reparations debate. Part II
discusses strategic consequences of attenuation and what reparations
advocates must do to move past this obstacle. Part III discusses how
to incorporate ideas of causation from the mass tort context to address
legal attenuation arguments. The conclusion will review strategic
considerations, and offers a few ideas for further addressing
attenuation.
In the end, I seek to set out a framework for analyzing attenuation,
and to work through some of the major legal attenuation problems.
This Article will not address all possible attenuation concerns, but will
address some major legal concerns, and will also set out a framework
for analyzing and addressing other attenuation problems, giving
Reparations Debate, 24 B.C. Third World L.J. 45, 52 (2003) (noting the problem of
attenuation); Art Alcausin Hall, There is a Lot to be Repaired Before We Get to
Reparations: A Critique of the Underlying Issues of Race That Impact the Fate of
African American Reparations, 2 Scholar 1, 27-32 (2003) (noting recurrence of the
attenuation defense); Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and
Other Historical Injustices, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 689, 708 (2003) (noting difficulty in
connecting past wrongs to present harm).
14
See infra Part II.A.
15
This article will primarily address attenuation in reparation cases brought for
the harm of slavery. Other reparations cases, such as lawsuits brought for the Tulsa
riots, present different questions of causation. See Keith N. Hylton, A Framework
for Reparations Claims, 24 B.C. Third World L.J. 31, 43 (2004) [hereinafter Hylton,
Framework] (“When thinking about reparations claims, one should avoid the mistake
of viewing them as monolithic, having the same difficulties in terms of identification
of plaintiffs, causation, and prescription of legal rights. In fact, reparations claims
vary along many legal dimensions, creating a rich array in terms of their consistency
with settled law.”); see generally Alfred L. Brophy, Reconstructing the Dreamland:
The Tulsa Riot of 1921 (2002) (giving background of Tulsa riots).
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reparations advocates analytical tools for more effectively addressing
other types of attenuation.16
I. Arguments About Reparations, Causation, and Attenuation
The first step in discussing attenuation is to examine the
attenuation arguments that reparations opponents use. As now
constituted, the literature does not recognize the different arguments in
play. In this part I break down the attenuation arguments used by
reparations opponents. These include both moral and legal arguments.
Much of this Part is descriptive, setting out various attenuation
arguments as they have been used. This Part is also classificatory, in
16

A brief word is necessary on the tone of this Article. The tone of an article
typically reflects much of the author’s own worldview. An article may be preaching
to the choir, or it may seek a tone that is more appropriate for a broader audience.
Article tone is particularly important within the reparations literature. Reparations
critics often frame their arguments in carefully neutral ways. In contrast, many
reparations advocates have employed a “within the movement” tone. See also
Forde-Mazrui, supra note 8, at 689-90 (noting that “arguments advanced on both
sides of this controversy often conflate concepts that should be kept distinct” and
providing examples of this problem).
The resulting differences in tone — compare critics like Posner and Vermeule,
supra note 13, or Jeremy Waldron, Superceding Historic Injustice, 103 Ethics 4
(1992), with advocates such as Robinson, supra note 1, or Matsuda, supra note 1 —
can create the harmful perception that reparations advocates are only speaking to the
converted, and that neutral scholars are skeptical of the idea of reparations. Cf.
Forde-Mazrui, supra note 8, at 689 (“Although much has been written on the subject,
particularly in the context of affirmative action and reparations, the literature tends to
be dominated by extreme positions incapable of taking competing claims
seriously.”). That perception, in turn, makes reparations arguments easier to
marginalize or ignore. Id. at 685 (“Although much has been written on the subject,
the scholarship too often sheds more heat than light, and tends to be dominated by
extreme positions incapable of taking opposing claims seriously.”).
This Article is intended to advance the idea of reparations. However,
throughout this Article — following the lead of some other recent articles by
reparations advocates, see, e.g., Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, FordeMazrui, supra note 8, I will employ a neutral tone. This Article has at least two
distinct audiences, reparations advocates and the general public. In adopting a tone
more suitable for a general audience, I hope to make my argument more effective.
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that it will place specific statements into one or more categories.
Following that classification, this Part will review some counterarguments that reparations advocates have used. By examining and
classifying reparations arguments, this Part will give us the tools we
need to discuss strategy, and how reparations advocates must deal with
attenuation.
Section A will briefly discuss causation and attenuation. Section B
will identify and define three types of attenuation that come up:
Vic tim, wrongdoer, and act attenuation. Section C will give examples
of attenuation critiques, and section D will discuss responses that
reparations advocates have offered. Section E recaps.
A.
But-For Cause, Proximate Cause, and Attenuation
Attenuation is a well-known theme in tort law. Every first-year
law student learns that a claimant must show causation in order to
establish liability.17 And while any number of factors may be
considered a “but-for” or “factual” cause of a harm,18 only some of
those will be considered legally actionable — those which the law
deems “proximate.”19 Attenuation is an attack on the move from butfor to proximate cause. Attenuation provides a distance between
actors. Courts may find that, because of attenuation, proximate cause
17

See Keeton et al., supra note 8, at 263-67.
Keeton et al., supra note 8, at 266 (“Many courts have devised a ruled,
commonly known as the ‘but-for’ or ‘sine qua non’ rule, which may be stated as
follows: The defendant’s conduct is a cause of the event if the event would not have
occurred but for that conduct; conversely, the defendant’s conduct is not a cause of
the event, if the event would have occurred without it.”); Gray, supra note 8, at 9091 (discussing but-for cause).
19
Keeton et al., supra note 8, at 263 (“An essential element of the plaintiff’s
cause of action for negligence, of for that matter for any other tort, is that there be
some reasonable connection between the act or omission of the defendant and the
damages that the plaintiff has suffered. This connection is usually dealt with by the
courts in terms of what is called ‘proximate cause’ or ‘legal cause.’”); see also Gray,
supra note 8, at 85-91 (discussing proximate and but-for cause); Calabresi, supra
note 7, at 72-76 (discussing this difference).
18
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is not established.20 Attenuation is thus a major theme in discussions
of reparations.21
B. Types of Attenuation Arguments that Arise in Reparations
Slaves suffered many deprivations that could trigger tort liability.
They routinely suffered physical injury, loss of property, lost wages,
loss of liberty, loss of family relations, loss of consortium, and mental
anguish.22 Their descendants suffer today from residual racism, a
consequence of slavery. It is clear that slavery was “[a] massive crime
against humanity . . . an American holocaust”.23
The tort
compensability of slavery is not negated by its legality at the time.24

20

See id. at 264; Gray, supra note 8, at 86-91.
See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 1, at 9; Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at
518-19. Attenuation not a special or uniquely high hurdle to forestall reparations
claims, though they may be unusually susceptible to this defense. Posner &
Vermeule, supra note 13, at 711. Attenuation is a familiar bugbear for civil rights
advocates.
See Maria L. Marcus, Learning Together: Justice Marshall’s
Desegregation Opinions, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 69, 90-95 (1992) (noting Supreme
Court use of attenuation to rule against desegregation claims).
There is certainly no agreement by reparations advocates that proximate cause
is not satisfied. Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 123-25; Forde-Mazrui,
supra note 8, at 728-33 (arguing that chain of proximate causation has not been
broken by actions of slave descendants).
22
See Keith N. Hylton, Slavery and Tort Law 4-34 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law,
Working Paper No. 03–02, 2003 Soc. Science Research Network Elec. Paper
Collection), at http:// www.bu.edu/law/faculty/papers/pdf_files/HyltonK012803.pdf
[hereinafter Hylton, Slavery] (discussing different torts which arise from slavery).
23
Robinson, supra note 1, at 33; see also Kevin Hopkins, Forgive U.S. Our
Debts?, Righting the Wrongs of Slavery, 89 Geo. L.J. 2531, 2534 (2001) (“The
wrongs done to African slaves during slavery, such as the physical capture and
exploitation of Africans for labor, the inhumane treatment and abuse of slaves by
white slaveholders, and the psychological abuses in failing to acknowledge and
respect African personhood, to name only a few, were horrible and unfathomable.”).
24
Tort law routinely compensates victims of harm cause by acts which were
legal when performed, such as use of asbestos or Agent Orange, or provision of
tobacco or DES.
21
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The tort case for slave reparations is strong, but is subject to defenses
of attenuation.
Attenuation arguments often come disguised or combined with
other arguments. Attenuation arguments in the reparations context
have three major thematic strands. These are victim attenuation,
wrongdoer attenuation, and act attenuation. These correspond to a
perceived lack of connection between deceased slaves and present
claimants (victim attenuation); between slave beneficiaries (slave
holders and governments) and modern citizens or governments
(wrongdoer attenuation); and between harmful acts of slavery and any
present injury.25 They are interrelated but distinct components of the
broader attenuation argument.
25

Some other writers have noted the presence of some of these general themes
in reparations. See Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 505 (“There are, then,
several distinct problems between connecting past and present. There are problems
in connecting the past wrongdoers with their successors (who would be the present
defendants); problems in connecting past victims with their successors (who would
be the present plaintiffs); and connections between past wrongs and present
claims.”); see also id. at 503-04 (“The claims are hard to fit into a traditional
framework for two reasons. First, the victims are making claims against people who
are not themselves wrongdoers. Furthermore, that defendant class may not have any
current benefit from the harm. In that case, there will be a claim asserted against a
discrete group of innocent people. . . . Often the perpetrators cannot be identified
with specificity or are no longer alive.”); Alfreda Robinson, Corporate Social
Responsibility and African American Reparations: Jubilee, 55 Rutgers L. Rev. 309,
365 (2003) (noting that opponents of reparations focus on specific difficulties
including “the absence of directly harmed individuals,” “the absence of individual
perpetrators,” and “the lack of direct causation”); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 13,
at 698 (“Reparations claims thus involve three relationships: (1) the relationship
between the original wrongdoer and the original victim; (2) the relationship between
the original wrongdoer and the possible payer of reparations; and (3) the relationship
between the original victim and the possible claimant or beneficiary of reparations.
The claimant must show that each relationship is of the proper type.”); id. at 699
(“Compensatory justice requires a relationship of identity between the wrongdoer
and payer and a relationship of identity between the victim and claimant.”); Verdun,
supra note 2, at 628-30 (“Opponents of reparations to African Americans argue that
living whites have not injured living African Americans; the wrongs of slavery were
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The first concern, victim attenuation, is that Blacks today are not
sufficiently linked to slaves, and are thus undeserving of any
recompense for slavery.26 The basic idea underlying this concern is
intuitive. Blacks living today were not directly subject to the harms of
slavery.27 Many Blacks may be slave descendants, but many others
are more recent arrivals who lack that connection as well.28 This lack
of connection creates victim attenuation. Victim attenuation is a
problem that is unique to intergenerational claims, where the claimant
is not the same person as an original victim.29 Since the present
claimant is not an original victim, and may have a relatively low
proportion of descent, she may be subject to victim attenuation
committed by individuals who have been dead for years. African Americans to day
were never slaves, and are not entitled to wages for slave labor performed over one
hundred years ago.”); Hylton, Framework, supra note 15, at 39-40 (discussing
different types of claims and distinguishing them based on whether injurers and
victims are identifiable).
Surprisingly, none of the existing scholarship discusses the significance, of
these different variants of attenuation. Nor does it classify and analyze these
divisions, as I do in this Article.
26
A related concern is that slave descendants today would not exist but for
slavery, and therefore are not entitled to recompense. See, e.g., Stephen Kershnar,
The Inheritance-Based Claim to Reparations, 8 Legal Theory 243, 247
- 51 (2002).
27
“Opponents also argue that African Americans today were never slaves and
did not directly experience the injustices of slavery and its effects and thus are not
entitled to any form of reparations.” Hall, supra note 13, at 30; see also Brophy,
Some Problems, supra note 1, at 518-20; Miller, supra note 13, at 52; David
Horowitz, Ten Reasons Why Reparations for Blacks is a Bad Idea for Blacks - and
Racist Too, Front Page Magazine, January 3, 2001.
28
See Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 519; Posner & Vermeule,
supra note 13, at 739; Graham Hughes, Reparations for Blacks?, 43 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1063, 1064 (1968) (noting difficulties in identifying plaintiffs); see also Linda
Chavez, Promoting Racial Harmony, in The Affirmative Action Debate 314, 314-22
(George E. Curry ed., 1996) (noting victim attenuation concerns relating to
affirmative action); Verdun, supra note 2, at 623 (discussing victim attenuation in
affirmative action); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 13, at 712 (same).
29
As such, victim attenuation arguments are limited to instances such as Black
reparations, Native American reparations, and similar intergenerational justice cases.
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arguments. Victim attenuation can be presented as a demand for
statistics. There is no reason that modern Blacks should be connected
to slaves, this argument goes.
The second type of attenuation is wrongdoer attenuation.
Wrongdoer attenuation exists because present-day citizens and
governments do not seem to be closely connected to slave owners,
suggesting that perhaps they should be required to pay for harms
caused by slavery.30 Many modern non-Blacks are not descendants of
slave owners, and have no apparent direct connections to them.31 All
30

See Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 519 (“The people who
perpetrated the crimes of slavery are gone and their estates are (mostly) distributed.
A few corporations survive and some of the money made from slavery is traceable to
currently existing bank accounts. However, there are significant problems in
imposing the liability of past generations of private actors on the current
generation.”); see also Matsuda, supra note 1, at 375 (“Of those taxpayers who must
pay the reparations, some are direct descendants of perpetrators while others are
merely guilty by association. Under a reparations doctrine, the working class whites
whose ancestors never harbored any prejudice or ill-will toward the victim group are
taxed equally with the perpetrators’ direct descendants for the sins of the past.”);
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 13, at 736 (“Reparations are rarely paid by the
original wrongdoers, that is, the individuals who performed the wrongful acts,
whether or not on behalf of a state or corporate body. Substantive moral
considerations must explain why nonwrongdoers—usually taxpayers or
shareholders—should pay reparations; when these considerations fail, prudential
considerations must be invoked.”); Hall, supra note 13, at 30 (“White America today
attempts to distance itself from both the ‘sins of slavery’ and of its forefathers, in an
effort to deny responsibility for the past and present problems associated with race.
Opponents of African American reparations contend that slavery and past injustices
by White Americans were not conducted by individuals living today, but rather by
individuals long dead.”).
31
This is recognized in the reparations literature. See, e.g., Brophy, Some
Problems, supra note 1, at 519; Verdun, supra note 2, at 629-30; Miller, supra note
13, at 52. And many modern Americans may not feel any sort of link to slave
owners. However, based on casual observation, there seems to be at least some
degree of connection that many white southerners feel for former slaveholders. This
can be seen, for instance, in the detailed civil war role-playing activities; the
contin ued prevalence of statues of confederate generals; the politically popular use of
the confederate flag; and the resurgence of historical societies such as the Daughters
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living citizens are a generation or more removed from slave owners.
In addition, many slave owner descendants are partial descendants
only — or even mixed descendants, with ancestry traceable both to
slaves and to slave owners.32 Vincene Verdun sums up the concepts
underlying wrongdoer attenuation as follows:
From the dominant perspective, it would be patently
unfair to make all white people or society pay for
slavery because that would necessarily include people
who did not participate in the wrong. These people
include whites who are descendants of abolitionists and
nonslaveholders, and immigrants, or descendants of
immigrants, who came to this country after slavery was
abolished; post slavery immigrants cannot be connected
with a wrong associated with slavery.33

of the Confederacy. Reparations opponents may be more connected to the past, and
in particular to the slave-owning past, than they tend to admit in discussions about
liability. See Jason Zengerle, Lost Cause, The New Republic, August 2, 2004, at 14
(discussing popularity of Confederate reenactment and historical groups); see also
Carter Davis, Race and Reparations, Alabama City magazine, April 24, 2004,
available
online
at
http://www.al.com/news/citymagazine/index.ssf?/base/news/1082801701197890.xm
l, at 5 (noting concerns raised by opponents about the “legacy” of the University of
Alabama when professor Al Brophy suggested the university investigate its slave
owning past).
32
See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 13, at 740 (“The more difficult problem
exists when the wrongdoing occurs on a large scale, and the wrongdoers and victims
miscegenate, or their descendants miscegenate. A descendant of a victim might
therefore also be the descendant of a wrongdoer. With sufficient mixing, reparations
become pointless. It makes no sense for a person to pay reparations from one pocket
to the other. Even with more limited mixing, one must grapple with the question
whether to treat people differently on the basis of how many ancestors belong to the
class of victims and how many belong to the class of wrongdoers.”).
33
Verdun, supra note 2, at 630; see also The Conversation, Wash. Post, July
23, 2000, at F1 (“As a white woman, I am tired of being blamed for slavery
because—and only because—I am white, when the fact of the matter is I am
descended from Irish and German immigrants who didn’t arrive on Ellis Island until
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Wrongdoer attenuation is a concern because reparations is often
presented as a demand for justice.34 The criticism may be presented
through statistics, such as noting the number of people who have
arrived in the country since 1865, the percent of the populace
descendant from post-bellum immigrants, and so forth.35 While victim
attenuation may evoke the possibility of an unjustified windfall,
wrongdoer attenuation brings the image of an unjustified penalty.36
That is a strongly negative image to overcome in a society which
places high value, at least rhetorically, on the protection of the
innocent.37 As Posner and Vermeule note, “a strong tradition in the
United States holds that individuals are not blameworthy for acts over
which they have no control.”38
well after the Civil War.”) (statement of Peggy Sakagawa); Massey, supra note 9, at
162.
34
Reparations advocates may be inadvertently encouraging this critique, by the
use of the language of culpability in reparations literature. See Miller, supra note 13
,
at 49-52 (arguing that reparations advocates have created problems by being
unnecessarily confrontational); see also Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at
519 n.94 (“My point is that in talking about reparations for slavery and Jim Crow,
one must be careful in talking about claims of victims against perpetrators, when
many of the people against whom claims are being asserted are not perpetrators.”);
Alfred Brophy, Taking Reparations Seriously, (Unpublished Manuscript), at 16
(“For many reparationists, the focus is upon past harm as a way of arguing for
reparations. Among others there seems to be little interest in reconciliation. But
those voices are not the leaders in the field. They do not represent the most
thoughtful reparationists.”). See generally Lee A. Harris, Political Autonomy as a
Form of Reparations, 29 Southern L. Rev. 25 (2001); Lee A. Harris, “Reparations”
as a Dirty Word: The Norm Against Slavery Reparations, 33 U. Memphis L. Rev.
409 (2003).
35
See Horowitz, supra note 27, at 3-4.
36
See Waldron, supra note 16, at 26-27 (noting these concerns). In addition,
reparations opponents sometimes suggest that past acts, such as the civil war,
constitute sufficient payments for slavery. See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, supra note
13, at 730-31 (noting this argument); Horowitz, supra note 27, at 9.
37
Verdun, supra note 2, at 620-22.
38
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 13, at 699; Daryl Levinson, Collective
Sanctions, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 345, 347-48 (2003). In instances where group sanctions

14

CAUSATION AND ATTENUATION

Finally, the third prong of attenuation — act attenuation — is that
there is no direct connection between past wrongdoing and present
harm. One critic notes, “another problematic consideration is
causation, which invokes the question of whether the injury presently
complained of was a foreseeable product of the defendant’s conduct. . .
. it is necessary to wrestle with the issue of whether that past conduct
has caused injury to a contemporary plaintiff.”39 This objection is also
easy to understand. It can be difficult, after all, to connect the harms
of slavery to specific disadvantages of Blacks today. Indeed, it is not
easy to characterize Blacks as a cohesive economic group at all. There
are vast differences in wealth, status, and class among individual
Blacks.40 Some individuals appear to have integrated smoothly into
society, while others have not.41 The difficulty of unraveling potential
contributing (or ameliorating) causes leads to act attenuation.
Act attenuation is important because the legal system generally
requires that victims and wrongdoers establish a direct connection
between a wrongful act and a claimant’s injury.42 Attenuation is a
are tolerated, it is often as a form of deterrence, see id. at 348-49, and such
consequentialist justification would not apply to the case of reparations for slavery.
See Massey, supra note 9, at 165 (noting that reparations have no deterrent value);
see also Levinson, supra, at 347-48 (noting that Blacks have been subjected to
collective sanctions in the past).
39
Massey, supra note 9, at 162-63.
40
Matsuda, supra note 1, at 375. Of course, despite these differences, Blacks
are overwhelmingly less well-off than whites. See generally Robert Westley, Many
Billions Gone, Is it Time to Reconsider the Case for Black Reparations?, 40 B.C. L.
Rev. 429, 471-72 (1998) (same).
41
As Mari Matsuda notes, “Not all members of the victim group are similarly
situated. Some are rich, some poor. Some feel betrayed, others do not. Some are
easily identifiable as group members, others have weak claims to membership.”
Matsuda, supra note 1, at 375.
42
See id. at 380-81 (“The linkage of victims and perpetrators for acts occurring
in the immediate past is another trait of standard legal claims.”); see also Brophy,
Some Problems, supra note 1, at 505 (“Closely related to the difficulty of
identification of victims and wrongdoers is the requirement that there be a close
connection between past wrong and present claim.”); Verdun, supra note 2, at 624
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factor in standing inquiry. The Supreme Court notes that a relevant
question in deciding standing is, “Is the line of causation between the
illegal conduct and injury too attenuated?”43 As a challenge to the
connection between an initial act and a harm, act attenuation may be
viewed as an attack on the very idea of statistical proof. As Al Brophy
writes, “[f]ormulating a legal claim requires linking past perpetrators
with people who currently exist. It also involves linking past victims
with people who are making a claim in the present—or what one might
call present victims of past discrimination.”44 The difference between
victim and act attenuation is subtle. While victim attenuation says
“you are not a person who may bring a claim,” act attenuation says,
“you have not suffered any harm.” When combined with the doctrine
of standing, act attenuation—“you have not suffered any harm” — can
lead to victim attenuation—“you are not a person who may bring a
claim.”
These three types of attenuation are used, often together, to suggest
that reparations for slavery would not be appropriate. These critiques
are not unique to the case of Black slavery, and can potentially apply
in most or all reparations-type actions.45
C.
Examples of the Attenuation Critique
The problem of attenuation arises in three major areas: the
legislature, the courts, and the media and popular opinion. Each of
these areas is affected differently by attenuation arguments.
1. Legislature
The effect of attenuation arguments in the legislature is to
undermine the legitimacy of proposed reparations legislation. In
(noting this requirement in affirmative action). This is a common theme in tort law.
See, e.g., F.R.C.P. 23 (setting out commonality requirement in class action lawsuits).
43
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757-58 (1984) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 504 (1975).
44
Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 504.
45
See Matsuda, supra note 1, at 372 (discussing attenuation defense in
connection with reparations claims by Native Hawaiians); see also Posner &
Vermeule, supra note 13, at 699-711 (noting these types of objections to reparations
generally).
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particular, wrongdoer attenuation comes into play. Representative
Henry Hyde, then-chair of the House Judiciary Committee, argued that
“the notion of collective guilt for what people did [200-plus] years
ago, that this generation should pay a debt for that generation, is an
idea whose time has gone. I never owned a slave. I never oppressed
anybody. I don’t know that I should have to pay for someone who did
[own slaves] generations before I was born.”46 These sorts of
attenuation arguments are often both moral and political.47
2. Courts
The attenuation problem also appears in court cases, generally as
part of the analysis of standing, where victim attenuation is raised.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Cato v. United States,
dismissed reparations claims brought against the government, stating
that:
Cato proceeds on a generalized, class-based grievance;
she neither alleges, nor suggests that she might claim,
any conduct on the part of any specific official or as a
result of any specific program that has run afoul of a
constitutional or statutory right and caused her a
discrete injury. Without a concrete, personal injury that
is not abstract and that is fairly traceable to the
government conduct that she challenges as
unconstitutional, Cato lacks standing.48

46

See Merida, supra note 2, at C-01; see also 136 Cong. Rec. S1312-03,
Statement of Sen. Bumpers (Feb. 21, 1990) (stating that “ I am a son of the South.
But I never owned a slave. My father never owned a slave” in arguing that modern
Turkey should not be blamed for the Armenian genocide).
47
See Eric Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and
African American Claims, 40 B.C. L. Rev. 477, 496-97 (1998) (discussing political
component of reparations arguments).
48
70 F.3d at 1109-110. The court elaborated, “she does not trace the presence
of discrimination and its harm to the United States rather than to other persons or
institutions. Accordingly, Cato lacks standing to bring a suit setting forth the claims
she suggests.” Id.
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Similarly, the district court in the In re African-American Slave
Descendants Litigation dismissed a number of consolidated claims in
related cases brought against corporations.49 That consolidated case
proceeded under a different theory than Cato; it was brought not
against the government but against corporations whose predecessor
entities had benefited from slavery. Despite this difference, the issue
of standing again proved decisive.50 The court wrote that:
Plaintiffs’ alleged injury is derivative of the injury
inflicted upon enslaved African-Americans over a
century ago. This is insufficient to establish standing,
and contrary to centuries of well-settled legal principles
requiring that a litigant demonstrate a personal stake in
an alleged dispute. . . . Plaintiffs cannot establish a
personal injury sufficient to confer standing by merely
alleging some genealogical relationship to AfricanAmericans held in slavery over one- hundred, twohundred, or three-hundred years ago.51
Plaintiffs had sought to establish standing by arguing that they
were slave descendants, and claiming that, as the rightful heirs of their
ancestors’ assets, they suffered injury because their ancestors were not
compensated for their labor.52 The court disagreed: “Plaintiffs’ claim
to the economic wealth of their ancestors’ labor is conjectural. While
most would like to assume that they will be the beneficiaries of their
ancestors’ wealth upon their demise, this is a mere assumption.”53 In
addition, the court ruled that the plaintiffs did not meet the
49

In re African-American Slave Descendants Litigation, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027
(N.D. Ill. 2004).
50
The case was dismissed in part because of standing and attenuation issues,
and in part because of the statute of limitations. See id at 1065-75 (discussing
statutes of limitation); id. at 1070-75 (discussing exceptions to the statute of
limitations); see generally Robinson, supra note 25, at 366-68 (discussing statutes of
limitations); Wenger, supra note 1, at 244-48 (same).
51
Id. at 1047, 1051.
52
Id. at 1048.
53
Id. at 1048.
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requirements for third party standing: “Plaintiffs have not alleged a
legally sufficient relation to their ancestors. All that Plaintiffs allege is
a genealogical relationship, and more is required under the law in
order to confer third-party standing.”54
These conclusions show the difficulty courts have in dealing with
attenuation. The Slave Descendants court based parts of its opinion on
all three types of attenuation. It mentioned wrongdoer attenuation —
“the allegations of Plaintiff’s Complaint do not link these Defendants
to the alleged harm”55 — and act attenuation — “Plaintiffs’ complaint
is devoid of any allegations that any specific conduct of the
Defendants was a cause of the continuing injuries of which Plaintiffs
complain.”56 In particular, the Slave Descendants court, like the Cato
court, focused on victim attenuation — “Plaintiffs cannot establish a
personal injury sufficient to confer standing”.57
Thus, the problems of victim, wrongdoer, and act attenuation
certainly have been decisive in reparations suits in the courts.58
54

Id. at 1053. As the court noted, the requirement is that the party asserting
third party standing show some injury in fact, and that that party also show that
prudential considerations weigh in its favor. Id. at 1052-53.
55
Id. at 1048 (emphasis added). The Court also wrote that the “Complaint is
devoid of any allegations that connect the specifically named Defendants or their
predecessors and any of the Plaintiffs or their ancestors,” wrote the court. Id. at 1041.
56
Id. at 1049-50.
57
Id. at 1051; see id. at 1048; see also id. at 1064 (“Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails
to connect any alleged injury of any one of the Plaintiffs or their ancestors to alleged
conduct by any one of the Defendants or their predecessors. . . . [T]he allegations in
a complaint must be those relating to the plaintiff, not those of someone else.”).
58
Other reparations cases in the courts have largely followed the reasoning of
Cato without further discussion. See Bell v. United States, No. Civ. A.
301CV0338D, 2001 WL 1041792, at *2 (N.D.Tex. Aug.31, 2001) (citing Cato in
holding that plaintiff lacked standing); Bey v. United States Department of Justice,
No. 95 CIV 10401, 1996 WL 413684, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 1996) (same);
Langley v. United States, No. C 95-4227, 1995 WL 714378, at *2 (N.D.Cal. Nov.30,
1995) (same); see also Himiya v. United States, No. 94 C 4065, 1994 WL 376850,
*2 (N.D.Ill. July 15, 1994) (citing Cato in dismissing on sovereign immunity
grounds).
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3. Media and Literature
Every type of attenuation has been discussed in the media. The
idea of wrongdoer attenuation has been raised by many prominent
critics of reparations. For example, Armstrong Williams criticizes the
reparations movement for “seek[ing] to penalize our current
government for what white slave holders did centuries ago.”59 John
McWhorter argues that some “obvious retorts” to the idea of
reparations include “that many whites in America today arrived after
emancipation [and] that many whites owned no slaves.”60 David
Horowitz has stated that reparations are inappropriate because “only a
tiny minority of white Americans ever owned slaves” and “most
[modern] Americans have no connection (direct or indirect) to
slavery,” among other reasons.61 Michelle Malkin writes that
reparations advocates seek payments from “the U.S. government,
which means American taxpayers, which means tens of millions of
people who had nothing remotely whatsoever to do with inflicting
such injustice on anyone.”62 And other critics of reparations have
voiced similar opinions.63
59

Armstrong Williams, Presumed Victims, in Should America Pay?, supra note
1, at 165, 167; see also id. at 170 (noting conceptual difficulty in assessing
reparations against post-bellum immigrants)
60
John McWhorter, Against Reparations, in Should America Pay?, supra note
1, at 191.
61
Horowitz, supra note 27, at 1. This article was widely distributed and
received nationwide attention. See Brophy, Cultural War, supra note 3, at 1201.
62
Michelle Malkin, Get Out Your Reparations Calculator, TownHall.com,
August
15,
2002,
available
online
at
http://www.townhall.com/columnists/michellemalkin/mm20020815.shtml .
63
See, e.g., CNN, Crossfire, August 20, 2002, available online at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/08/20/cf.crossfire/index.html (statement
of Tucker Carlson) (“You are not responsible for what your ancestors did. Given
that, isn’t it against the idea of justice in this country, maybe even immoral, to take
money from people as punishment for a deed they didn’t commit?”); Jonah
Goldberg, National Review, March 19, 2001 (“Most of ‘white’ America — which
includes many Hispanics — does not consist of the descendents of slave owners or
even beneficiaries of slavery. The folks from my father’s side of the family, for

20

CAUSATION AND ATTENUATION

Other, less oppositional voices have also wondered about these
concerns. Kevin Merida, a relatively sympathetic Washington Post
reporter, frames the potential issue as:
Why should American taxpayers who never owned
slaves pay for the sins of ancestors they don’t even
know? And what about those whose ancestors arrived
here long after slavery ended?”64
Media and literature critics of reparations also emphasize victim
attenuation. For example, one critic argues that “it is obscene to think
of this modern generation of black Americans profiting from the blood
money drawn nearly 140 years ago from the exploitation of slaves.”65
Merida notes that “Opponents say there is no precedent for paying
people who are dead, that reparations are usually awarded to
survivors.”66 Stephen Kershnar argues that modern Blacks have only
“token” rights of reparations because they are not sufficiently
connected to slaves.67 And Keith Hylton has argued that reparations
claims must be treated as derivative claims under tort law, which
means that as a practical matter they will fail.68
Similarly, media and pundit statements discuss act attenuation.
Horowitz writes that reparations is “based on the unfounded claim that
all African-American descendants of slaves suffer from the economic
example, didn’t arrive in the country until the Civil War — and they showed up
poor. My mom’s family is from Boston. So I don’t feel any particular ancestral guilt.
. . . And remember, 14% of Americans today are either immigrants or the children of
immigrants. That’s a lot of newcomers to blame for something done by old-timers.”).
64
Merida, supra note 2, at C-01.
65
Juan Williams, Slavery Isn’t the Issue, Wall Street Journal, April 14, 2002.
See also Adolph Reed, On Reparations, The Progressive, December 2000 (noting
difficulty of connecting modern victims with slave ancestors); Merida, supra note 2,
at C-01.
66
Merida, supra note 2, at C-01.
67
Kershnar, supra note 26, at 251-58; see also Janna Thompson, Historical
Injustice and Reparation: Justifying Claims of Descendants, 112 Ethics 114, 116-21
(2001) (suggesting that the passage of time precludes reparations).
68
Hylton, Slavery, supra note 22, at 38-45.
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consequences of slavery and discrimination” and that “no evidencebased attempt has been made to prove that living individuals have
been adversely affected by a slave system that was ended over 150
years ago.”69 A number of critics suggest that shortcomings of Blacks,
individually or as a group, are responsible for any present injury.70 A
“lack of sufficient connection between past wrong and present claim”
is an argument that Matsuda calls one of the “standard doctrinal
objections to reparations.”71
D.
Responses by Reparations Advocates
Reparations advocates understand that attenuation is a serious
concern. They have suggested various defenses to the attenuation
critiques. These include the idea of group harm and group benefit, a
focus on corporate identity (either of corporations or of the nation as a
whole), and fairness and equity concerns. For the reasons set out
below, none of the current responses has fully succeeded in addressing
the attenuation problem.72
69

Horowitz, supra note 27, at 6.
See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 8, at 728-33 (discussing these arguments); see
also Hylton, Framework, supra note 15, at 35-37 (discussing differences in Black
and white family structure).
71
Matsuda, supra note 1, at 373-74. Matsuda’s other standard objections are
“factual objections and excuse or justification for illegal acts; difficult identification
of perpetrator and victim groups; [and] difficulty of calculation of damages.” Id.;
see also id. at 374 (“The problem of specific identification of wrongdoers and
victims is a common objection to reparations.”).
72
Other strategic moves by reparations advocates have not affected the
attenuation issue. For example, some advocates have suggested bringing claims
under a theory of unjust enrichment. Unjust enrichment is perceived to have certain
advantages, such as possible advantages in dealing with statutes of limitation. See
Anthony Sebok, Reparations, Unjust Enrichment, and the Importance of Knowing
the Difference Between the Two, 58 NYU Ann. Surv. Am. L. 651, 653 (2003). It
was a legal theory that was successfully employed in the Holocaust litigation. See
id.; see also Anthony Sebok, Prosaic Justice, 2002 Legal Aff. 51, 52. This approach
offers some benefits with regard to attenuation as well; it depends only on a showing
that a payer was unjustly enriched, and so it may lessen the difficulty of overcoming
70
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1. Group Harm and Group Benefit
One response to attenuation concerns, articulated by advocates
such as Mari Matsuda, has been to argue that reparations should be
based on an idea of group harm and group benefit.73 Thus, addressing
ideas of wrongdoer attenuation, Matsuda writes:
A horizontal connection exists as well within the
perpetrator group. Members of the dominant class
continue to benefit from the wrongs of the past and the
presumptions of inferiority imposed upon victims. They
may decry this legacy, and harbor no racist thoughts of
their own, but they cannot avoid their privileged
status.74
This group benefit approach has also been advocated by other
reparations advocates.
Christopher Hitchens notes that slaves
benefited even non-slaveholders, while immigrants benefited from the
legacy of slavery.75
Similarly, Matsuda addresses victim attenuation through the idea
of group harm. “The continuing group damage engendered by past
wrongs ties victim group members together, satisfying the horizontal
unity sought by the legal mind,” writes Matsuda.76 Among the group

act attenuation. However, unjust enrichment has serious drawbacks. It is uniquely
susceptible to equitable defenses. Sebok, supra, at 655. It also may be a less morally
compelling argument. Id. at 657; Sebok, supra, at 52-53. In addition, the Slave
Descendants court rejected unjust enrichment claims, along with other claims. See In
re African-American Slave Descendants Litigation, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1068,
1075-76 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
73
Matsuda, supra note 1, at 377. Matsuda labels her approach “looking to the
bottom.” Id.
74
Id. at 377-379.
75
Christopher Hitchens, Debt of Honor, in Should America Pay?, supra note 1,
at 172, 176-77.
76
Matsuda, supra note 1, at 377.
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harms cited are racism, stereotyping, demographic disadvantages, and
physical attacks on group members.77
Thus, group harm addresses victim attenuation, while group
benefit addresses wrongdoer attenuation.78
Both victim and
wrongdoer can have acts ascribed to them based on their membership
in the group.
However, group harm and benefit are of limited utility precisely
because they do not fit within the existing tort paradigm. They are
thus easy for courts and critics to reject outright. As one critic notes,
“many advocates of reparations enthusiastically embrace the notion of
collective rights and collective liability, but they have the burden of
proving why it is that we should displace our fundamental notions of
individual rights and responsibilities with a collectivist version of
rights and responsibilities.”79 Because group harm and benefits
arguments fail to address critics on their own terms, they are not an
effective response to legal attenuation arguments.80 To the extent that
77

Id.
Cf. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 13, at 699 (“If the wrongdoer and victim
must be individuals—the premise of ethical individualism—then compensatory
justice will rarely justify a reparations scheme. The reason is that as we define
reparations either the wrongdoer-payer or the victim-claimant relationship must not
be one of identity. But if the wrongdoer and victim can be groups, then payers or
claimants will sometimes be individuals who are not the original wrongdoers or
victims—rather, they derive their rights or obligations from their membership in the
group.”).
79
Massey, supra note 9, at 166.
80
Matsuda, supra note 1, at 380-88; Hylton, Slavery, supra note 22, at 47-48
(stating that any legal decision is likely to follow current tort law doctrines); Posner
& Vermeule, supra note 13, at 715-21; see also Brophy, Some Problems, supra note
1, at 519 (noting “some problems” with the group harm formulation).
In addition, group harm and benefit arguments create some special problems.
In particular, under current constitutional jurisprudence, a reparations scheme based
on group harm might be likely to be invalidated as unconstitutional. “Nonblacks
may sue to enjoin the program on the straightforward claim that they suffer both
economic and stigmatic injuries by virtue of the government’s provision of a racebased benefit.” Posner & Vermeule, supra note 13, at 716; see also Brophy, Some
Problems, supra note 1, at 529 (noting that in cases seeking a remedy based on racial
78
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they are accepted at all, they will be viewed as a moral response, while
the major victim attenuation problem is a legal obstacle.
2. Corporate Identity
A second response has been to argue that corporations, due to their
legal nature, are still the same entities that oppressed the slaves.
Alfreda Robinson has made this argument. She notes that:
The corporate benefits derived from Forced Labor were
undoubtedly a substantial factor in the success of these
companies. Accordingly, these present day companies
continue to be unjustly enriched as a result of the past.
Private inheritances linked to the wealth of these
companies also unjustly obtained the benefits of these
Americans who were forced to labor under slave
conditions for no reason.81
This approach solves the problem of wrongdoer attenuation. The
corporations cannot claim that they are not the same as the wrongdoer
entity. However, this approach does little to remedy victim or act
attenuation. Such a strategy has been used by reparations advocates,

classification “the court wants a close connection between the past discrimination
and the remedy being sought . . . the court seems unwilling—or at least reluctant—to
look further into the past”); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 13, at 712-14 (noting
current legal requirements for affirmative action programs). But cf. id. at 720 (“If
affirmative action can ever survive the narrow tailoring inquiry, reparations should
survive a fortiori.”).
81
Robinson, supra note 25, at 358-61. As Robinson notes, “successor
corporations are liable for the debts of the predecessor corporations” where certain
conditions are met. Id.; see also id. at 369 (“In the case of Corporate Reparations,
there are very likely direct victims or heirs of the same who can demonstrate specific
injury by a specific corporation. Accordingly, the standing doctrine is not an
impossible legal obstacle in the Corporate Reparations context.”). On jurors’
willingness to assess damages against corporations, see generally David A. Hoffman
& Michael P. O’Shea, Can Law and Economics Be Both Practical and Principled?,
53 Ala. L. Rev. 335, 395-98 (2002).
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such as in the Slave Descendants litigation.82 But the suit was
dismissed, precisely because it could not overcome the hurdles of
victim and act attenuation.83 This approach is also open to the
criticism that it is arbi trary.84
In addition, this response is a legal maneuver to address what is at
root a moral concern. While legal requirements may be satisfied by
finding payers with long legal lives, who owned slaves in their past,
popular opinion will still demand a moral answer for the question of
why a corporation’s shareholders, or a government’s citizens, are
ultimately paying for harms that they are generations removed from.
A related argument is that the country as a whole, with its
corporate identity, is liable for the harms caused by slavery.85 Robert
Fullinwider argues that “the real issues are corporate responsibility-the
responsibility of the nation as a whole-and civic responsibility-the
responsibility of each citizen to do his fair part in honoring the nation’s
obligations.”86 Kim Forde-Mazrui writes in a similar vein, “America
as a nation was responsible for protecting slavery and discrimination, a
responsibility that belongs to the nation as a nation and therefore
continues over time despite changeover in the American citizenry.”87

82

See Complaint and Jury Trial Demand, Farmer-Paellmann et al. v.
FleetBoston et al., No. CV-02-1862 (E.D.N.Y., Complaint filed Mar. 26, 2002)
(available online at http://www.nyed.uscourts.gov/02cv1862cmp.pdf) (seeking
reparations from corporations which benefited from slavery).
83
See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
84
See Hylton, Framework, supra note 15, at 37-38 (arguing that corporate
successor liability is morally problematic because it is “a matter of chance that some
corporations have been identified as successors”).
85
“The argument for reparations fits comfortably enough within the traditional
paradigm when we make sure the focus is on corporate liability, for the corporate
actor in question, the United States, is an “individual” under law. Indeed, precisely
because it is an “individual” that doesn’t die, it can acquire and retain debts over
many generations, though individual Americans come and go.” Robert Fullinwider,
The Case for Reparations, 20 Phil. & Pub. Pol’y Q. 213, 215 (2000).
86
Fullinwider, supra note 85, at 215-16.
87
Forde-Mazrui, supra note 8, at 686.
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This means critiquing not the individual slave owners, but the
government that allowed them to inflict their harm. Al Brophy writes,
“the proper understanding may not be class of victims against class of
perpetrators. It may be more correct to think of reparations in terms of
a class of victims against the government’s obligation to assist victims.
Phrased in that way, reparations for slavery and Jim Crow fit
comfortably alongside dozens [instances where] the government used
its power to assist those who needed help.”88 Brophy has advanced
such targeted reparations claims himself, seeking an apology from the
University of Alabama for its participation in slavery.89 And
reparations advocates can similarly seek reparations from governments
that held slaves directly and that thus have directly benefited from
slavery, while directly inflicting harm on slaves as well.90
This approach also solves the problem of wrongdoer attenuation,
but does not address victim or act attenuation. This, it is unclear that
this strategy would be successful in moving the litigation beyond its
88

Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 519-20; see also Fullinwider, supra
note 85, at 218 (“The real issues are corporate responsibility – the responsibility of
the nation as a whole – and civic responsibility – the responsibility of each citizen to
do his fair part in honoring the nation’s obligations. . . . The chief wrongs done to
African Americans, thus, were not simply the sum of many individual oppressions
added together but were the corporate acts of a nation. . . And so it is that Americans
not as individuals but as citizens owe support for the nation’s debt.”); id. at 220
(“When Congress passed the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 [granting reparations to
Japanese Americans interned during World War II], no one assumed that individual
Americans were being held accountable for personal wrongdoing. The interning of
Japanese Americans was an act of the United States government and its agents. . .
[each citizen] contributed a small portion, not because he had any personal
responsibility for the internment but because as a citizen he is required to bear his
share of the government’s necessary expenditures.”); Hall, supra note 13, at 30
(“However, this argument, proponents of African American reparations assert, does
not comport with other comparative issues, including the national debt, for which all
Americans must continue to pay despite its partial creation by other generations.”).
89
Davis, supra note 31, at 5.
90
See Wenger, supra note 1, at 239-40 (noting direct governmental
involvement in slavery).
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current position. In addition, it needs to be developed further, along
moral lines, to show the propriety of paying reparations. Finally, this
strategy is limited because it potentially (to the extent it targets
government entities) runs afoul of sovereign immunity.91 This is no
small concern; Cato was dismissed in part on sovereign immunity
grounds.92
3. Establishing Connections to Harm
Some reparations advocates cite to scholarly work showing the
connections between past slavery and present Black poverty.93 For
example, Tuneen Chisolm argues that “inequality has been structured
over many generations through . . . systematic barriers” for Blacks.94
Verdun notes that “comparative statistics on unemployment, income,
mortality rates, substandard housing, and education” reflect “the
effects of over 300 years of oppression.”95 Robert Westley notes the
continuing legacy of slavery as evidenced in the Black underclass.96
This work can potentially be used to defuse victim and act attenuation,
though it may need further development.
In particular, it will be important to develop and to increase social
awareness of research documenting the effects of slavery itself, and
controlling for other variables including general economic problems
suffered by minorities. Otherwise, this response — that Blacks are
poorer, less educated, shorter-lived, and so on — will beg the question
91

See generally Wenger, supra note 1, at 248-49 (discussing sovereign
immunity in reparations).
92
Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1107-11 (9th Cir. 1995).
93
See Wenger, supra note 1, at 222-25 (noting sources).
94
Tuneen E. Chisolm, Sweep Around Your Own Front Door: Examining the
Argument for Legislative African American Reparations, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 677,
687 (1999); see also id. at 688-90 (noting disparities in crime rate, poverty level,
home ownership, education, and income).
95
Verdun, supra note 2, at 664; see also Forde-Mazrui, supra note 8, at 695-99
(discussing social disadvantages suffered by Blacks and linking them to
discrimination and slavery).
96
Westley, supra note 40, at 441-44.
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of how much of the disparity can be traced to slavery.97 The relevant
question is whether slave descendants are poorer than non-slave
descendant Blacks; whether slave descendants are less educated than
non-slave descendant Blacks, and so forth. Disparate data points, such
as questions on family structure, must be addressed.98 Anecdotal
evidence suggests that slave descendants may suffer harm not shared
by other Blacks.99 But further quantification of the results of social
research that answers this question — and further publication of data
that shows this — is required. It is not enough simply to say that
Blacks are poorer than whites.100
4. Fairness and Equity
Finally, reparations advocates have argued that victim and act
attenuation should be discounted because of fairness or equity
considerations. Matsuda has argued that the magnitude of the harm
justifies treating reparations as a special case: “the proximate cause
question is essentially political. . . more egregious wrongs, such as
intentional torts, justify reaching across wider gulfs of time and space
97

Cf. Brophy, Taking Reparations Seriously, supra note 34, at 24-25 (noting
uncertainty of harm created by slavery); Hylton, Framework, supra note 15, at 34-36
(suggesting other potential contributing causes); Massey, supra note 9, at 163
(“Racism can and does exist where slavery never did, and racism is surely just one
among a number of contributors to this deplorable state of affairs.”).
98
For example, Keith Hylton has argued that “most of the difference between
white and black family poverty rates can be explained by family structure—
specifically, the low rate of marriage of black families below the poverty line.”
Hylton, Framework, supra note 15, at 34-35.
99
See Sara Rimer & Karen W. Arenson, Top Colleges Take More Blacks, but
Which Ones?, N.Y. Times, June 24, 2004, at A1 (noting that slave descendants are
less likely than other Blacks to be admitted to prestigious colleges).
100
Cf. Brophy, Taking Reparations Seriously, supra note 34, at 34 (“When we
are talking about even a modest reparations program, we will want to determine with
something approaching scientific precision the harm that continues, as well as the
benefits that have been conferred.”); see also Forde-Mazrui, supra note 8, at 687 &
nn. 9-10 (discussing arguments that Black disadvantages are a product of Black
culture).
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to connect act and injury.”101 Alfreda Robinson invokes the similar
argument that it would be unfair to allow the state to benefit from
attenuation caused by its own wrongdoing.
[G]iven the very high mortality rates caused by the
deplorable conditions of Forced Labor and the
murderous lawlessness and intimidation of the Ku Klux
Klan, it is not surprising that the direct victims are dead.
. . It is simply unfair to demand that the Reparations
advocates produce a specific living direct victim now
for every conceivable claim.102
Also in this vein, scholars note that negative effects on a victim’s
children are a logical result of wrongdoing. To the extent that slave
owners knew that they were harming slaves’ children, note Posner and
Vermeule, it may be unreasonable to view victim attenuation as an
obstacle, because slave descendants were a knowable victim
themselves of slave owner wrongdoing.103 Mari Matsuda makes this
argument as well. She notes that, “in determining foreseeability, the
classical legal mind typically considers whether a reasonable person
contemplating the consequences of a particular act would have
imagined the harm that in fact occurred.”104 Since “what a reasonable
101

Matsuda, supra note 1, at 382-83; see also id. at 383 (“Proximate cause
analysis is typically reduced to consideration of the innocence of the victim, the
culpability of the wrongdoer, the foreseeability and magnitude of the harm, and the
weight of the broad social goals of fair compensation, deterrence and retribution. . . .
It would have required no clairvoyant skill to predict the harm that would befall
Hawaiians from the loss of their nation and land, or the harm that would befall
Japanese-Americans taken abruptly from their homes to the desert relocation centers.
What a reasonable person would have predicted would occur, did in fact occur.”)
102
Robinson, supra note 25, at 353.
103
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 13, at 700. See also David Rosenberg, The
Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A Public Law Vision of the Tort
System, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 849, 884-85 (“But one could just as easily describe the
defendant’s duty in aggregative terms as a duty extending from the defendant to a
class — the exposed population. . . . The defendant’s wrongdoing inflicts loss on the
exposed population as a whole.”).
104
Matsuda, supra note 1, at 383.
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person would have predicted did in fact occur,” one classic test for
proximate causation is satisfied.105
The unfairness argument is unique to the concern of victim
attenuation. It is of unknown efficacy. One potential concern is that it
is a moral and logical argument, while the concerns of standing and
victim attenuation are legal concerns. Courts are fickle about
accepting fairness arguments. Fairness arguments may also be
susceptible to moral counter-arguments that also sound in fairness,
such as the fairness of requiring innocent citizens to bear the burden of
reparations.
E. Recap
This Part has examined expressed attenuation concerns to
determine their nature. Attenuation concerns can be broadly broken
into three main components:
Victim attenuation, wrongdoer
attenuation, and act attenuation. These components are important in
different contexts. Vic tim attenuation is especially important in the
legal arena, while wrongdoer attenuation is important in the public and
legislative arenas.
Both individually, and as a group, the existing responses to
attenuation have failed. Attenuation continues to be a fatal problem
for reparations litigation, and it continues to be a major problem in
advancing public acceptance of reparations. In part, the responses
have failed because they have not adequately considered the types of
attenuation that they are addressing, and because they have not
distinguished between legal and moral concerns.
II. Strategic Considerations: What Attenuation Means
This Part will discuss the effect that the attenuation critiques have
on reparations. In particular, it will discuss the interplay between
political and legal arguments about attenuation, and will examine how
105

See Calabresi, supra note 7, at 81 (discussing foreseeability as an element of
proximate cause).
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these components work together to create an obstacle for reparations.
It will delineate some ideas for addressing these different types of
attenuation and their differing effects.
A. Breakdown of Sub-Types of Attenuation
Stepping back from what courts and politicians have done, we can
discern some broad patterns and themes. The attenuation defense is
manifested in two different spheres. First, attenuation comes up in the
moral sphere, with concerns that it is somehow wrong for reparations
to be paid by those who are not connected to slavery.106 Second,
attenuation arises in the legal sphere, with objections that reparations
cannot for legal reasons be paid to plaintiffs who lack standing, or a
more direct connection to the slaves who were harmed. These are
opposite sides of the same coin.107 Just as the idea of reparations is
based on a joint legal and moral argument,108 attenuation provides a
joint legal and moral counter-argument.
Different types of attenuation have different roles in this interplay.
Wrongdoer attenuation is a major component of the moral objection to
106

Cf. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 8, at 685 (discussing moral arguments about
reparations and affirmative action).
107
Massey, supra note 9, at 157 (“When grappling with providing reparations
for slavery, two distinct categories of issues emerge: legal and political.”).
108
Miller, supra note 13, at 50 (“Reparations, on this account, involves a
demand for restoration of the ill-gotten gains of slavery to the group that was
wronged. In so doing, it suggests both a legal strategy and an emotionally compelling
moral argument. The legal strategy requires us to identify the various ways that
blacks were harmed by whites who profited from slavery and then to sue for the
repayment of those profits either to individuals or into some central fund for more
general disbursement. The moral argument asserts that whites as a group were, and
continue to be, responsible for the ills of the African American community. It is the
power and simplicity of that moral claim that makes reparations at once so
compelling an argument and so difficult for the vast majority of whites to endorse.”);
cf. Yamamoto, supra note 47, at 518 (“Those seeking reparations need to draw on
the moral force of their claims (and not frame it legally out of existence) while
simultaneously radically recasting reparations in a way that both materially benefits
those harmed and generally furthers some larger interests of mainstream America.”).
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reparations. Act attenuation is an important part of the legal objection.
Victim attenuation raises major concerns that are both legal and moral.
The different roles that different types of attenuation play is set out in
the following chart:
Chart 1: Types of Attenuation
Legal Objection
Wrongdoer Attenuation Lack of culpability
Victim Attenuation

Standing

Act Attenuation

Causation

Moral Objection
Whites shouldn’t
have to pay
Blacks shouldn’t be
compensated
Lack of entitlement

As the chart sets out, there are six different sub-types of the
attenuation argument. And as a result of the different types of
attenuation and the different spheres where they are used (moral or
legal), reparations advocates must address them each of these
concerns. Legal concerns impact reparations lawsuits, while moral
concerns undermine legislative attempts to seek reparations.109
These sub-types are related to each other. In particular, in the
reparations context, legal concerns of victim and act attenuation are
interrelated. Victim attenuation problems of standing exist because
courts are unsure that current claimants can show a harm to them. The
same perceived inability to show harm would inevitably create act
attenuation concerns at any trial. Thus, at least within the legal sphere
in reparations, victim attenuation and act attenuation have a similar
109

The repeated use of attenuation saps the moral strength of reparations
arguments, weakening the case for reparations in the public eye. See Brophy,
Reparations Talk, supra note 1, at 86 (“The future of the movement undoubtedly will
be determined in large part by our success in making a compelling moral argument
for reparations that gains political support.”).
Moral concerns may also have indirect effects on legal outcomes. See FordeMazrui, supra note 8, at 691.
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cause and are closely linked. (There is some difference between them.
In particular, a weaker connection between victims and harm may
satisfy the victim attenuation standing concerns, while a stronger
connection may eventually need to be shown to establish causation at
trial.)
It is generally necessary to address concerns by using arguments of
the same legal or moral type. Legal concerns about attenuation must
be addressed with legal arguments, and moral concerns with moral
arguments. The legal concern of standing (victim attenuation) cannot
be adequately addressed by moral arguments alone, despite the fact
that some moral arguments on fairness are quite strong. Similarly,
strong moral arguments against wrongdoer attenuation — that
“innocent” whites should not be forced to pay for slavery — will not
be adequately addressed by legal strategies that target governments
and corporations that, through their long legal lives, were direct
participants in slavery.
The legal and moral dimensions of reparations correspond closely
to the different theories of justice that reparations advocates rely
upon.110 Reparationists walk a fine line between corrective and
distributive justice.111 Corrective justice attempts to put people in the
position they would have been if the wrongful act had not occurred.
Dis tributive justice is the idea that wealth should be more evenly
distributed to the less fortunate.112
110

See generally Peter Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice and its Relation
to Distributive Justice, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 515, 515-30 (1992) (discussing differences
between corrective and distributive justice ideas); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of
Private Law (1995) (same); Stephen Perry, On the Relationship between Corrective
and Distributive Justice, in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, 4th series (Jeremy
Horder, ed., 2000).
111
See Hylton, Framework, supra note 15, at 32 (noting “two distinct and in
some ways conflicting policies behind reparations litigation. One approach is driven
in large part by social welfare and distributional goals. The other approach is based
on a desire to correct historical injustices; simply to ‘do justice.’”).
112
See id. at 33 (“At the heart of the FleetBoston [reparations] suit is a belief
that reparations litigation will compensate or correct for years and years of
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Some argue that corrective justice requires society to compensate
for harms suffered by Blacks.113 Others advocate ideas that are based
on distributive justice.114 Distributive justice ideas do not fit well
within the tort system, which is a corrective justice system.115
Attenuation arguments may have different effects depending on the
theory of justice one espouses. Wrongdoer attenuation, for instance,
may be more important in corrective justice, with the idea that the
bilateral nature of corrective justice is not just that the victim receives
compensation, but that the guilty party pays.
B. Practical Results of Successful Legal Attenuation Arguments
Many reparations advocates candidly admit that reparations are
unlikely to be awarded at trial, and that the most fruitful route is
legislative act or some sort of settlement.116 Indeed, victories for other
groups that have sought reparations have come through settlement, not
trial.117 However, one key to settlement is the existence of potentially
inattention, or insufficient attention, to the welfare of African Americans.”). This is
similar to the redistributive goal of the tobacco class action litigation. Id.; see also
Massey, supra note 9, at 158-67 (discussing the two different approaches).
113
Forde-Mazrui, supra note 8, at 685, 707-09; David Lyons, Corrective
Justice, Equal Opportunity, and the Legacy of Slavery and Jim Crow, Boston
University School lf Law, Working Paper Series, Public Law & Legal Theory, No.
03-15,
available
at
http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/papers/pdf_files/LyonsD073003.pdf (2003).
114
See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 1, at 375-80.
115
Lyons, supra note 113, at 1-4; Forde-Mazrui, supra note 8, at 685, 707-09.
116
Westley, supra note 40, at 436 (arguing that it is Congress, and possibly
state legislatures, that must be persuaded to enact reparations); Brophy, Some
Problems, supra note 1, at 534-39 (noting need for development of dialogue and
scholarship to address the possibility of settlement); Miller, supra note 13, at 51-57
(suggesting that settlement is more likely to be successful than litigation); Wenger,
supra note 1, at 256-58 (same).
117
These have included reparations for Holocaust victims and for Americans of
Japanese Ancestry imprisoned during World War II. See Posner & Vermeule, supra
note 13, at 694-98 (noting Holocaust and AJA cases); Brophy, Some Problems,
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valid legal claims, and another key is the exertion of political
pressure.118 Any eventual settlement will need to be palatable to the
general populace.119 Thus, it is likely that a chronology for reparations
success will follow certain stages:
Stage one: Initial claims are presented. Non-colorable claims are
unsuccessful in the courts. Politicians do not take claims seriously.
This is the current state of reparations litigation.
Stage two: Colorable claims are presented. These result in a
plaintiff’s victory, at least at the District level. The inevitable appeal
forces courts and politicians to reexamine the idea of reparations.
Stage three:
Politicians and media figures begin to take
reparations claims seriously. There is a public debate and assessment
of important issues at the political and public level.
Stage four: If it is deemed politically feasible, a settlement offer
may be made.
This timeline follows the general timelines of many mass tort and
reparations actions.120 It will require that reparations advocates devise
supra note 1, at 499-500; Westley, supra note 40, at 449-59; In Re Holocaust
Victims Assets Litigation, 105 F. Supp. 2d 139 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (approving
settlement).
118
See Yamamoto, supra note 47, at 479-82; 496-97 (discussing political
element in reparations advocacy); Brophy, Takings Reparations Seriously, supra
note 34, at 38-39; Hylton, Framework, supra note 15, at 34 (“Proponents of . . .
reparations claims believe that significant redistribution towards groups that make up
America’s underclass will not be achieved through legislative action. Thus,
reparations proponents have turned to the courts.”).
119
See Hopkins, supra note 23, at 2539 (noting that any settlement will require
support from white voters). Reparations advocates must bear in mind the interest
convergence problem, as laid out by Derrick Bell — that Blacks are most likely to be
politically successful when they can convince whites that their political interests are
aligned. Brophy, Taking Reparations Seriously, supra note 34, at 39; Derrick Bell,
Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 Harv. L.
Rev. 518 (1980).
120
Cf. See Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort
Litigation, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 853, 874-75 (1992); Peter H. Schuck, Agent Orange on
Trial (1986) (describing trial and resolution, including process of arriving at
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legal strategies to advance past Cato, and Slave Descendants which
keep reparations stalled at the first Stage. That is, both legal and moral
concerns must be addressed prior to any settlement.
Chart 2: Simplified Strategic Chronology
Legal
Concerns
Addressed

Moral
Concerns
Addressed

Settlement

Given this timeline, the effect of attenuation concerns —
particularly the unrebutted legal concerns — becomes more clear. The
movement for reparations suits is currently living “in the shadow of”
attenuation. Unrebutted legal attenuation concerns are an immediate
problem. Unrebutted moral concerns will also eventually need to be
addressed.
As suggested earlier, responses to attenuation have not been
particularly effective. Our analytical tools give a reason for this:
Responses to attenuation have failed to appreciate the different subtypes of argument. The result is that not all attenuation arguments
have been adequately addressed.

settlement); In Re Holocaust Victims Assets Litigation, 105 F. Supp. 2d 139
(E.D.N.Y. 2000) (approving settlement).
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Chart 3: Responses to Attenuation
Legal Response
Wrongdoer Attenuation Suits against
government and
corporations
Victim Attenuation
None
Act Attenuation
None (possibly
social research)

Moral Response
None (possibly group
benefit)
Fairness, Group harm
Fairness

As this chart demonstrates, three of the six sub-types of attenuation
have yet to be addressed by reparations advocates. In addition, the
limited effectiveness of some responses to attenuation makes the case
against attenuation even weaker. Suits against government solve the
problem of wrongdoer attenuation in the legal sphere, but may be
unworkable due to sovereign immunity. Fairness responses are
probably more effective in the moral sphere. An assessment of the
effectiveness of responses to attenuation is thus:
Chart 4: Effectiveness of Responses to Attenuation

Victim
Attenuation

Legal Response
Suits against government and
corporations
Effectiveness: Limited due to
sovereign immunity.
None
Effectiveness: Ineffective

Act
Attenuation

None (possibly social research)
Effectiveness: Ineffective

Wrongdoer
Attenuation

Moral Response
None (possibly group
benefit)
Effectiveness:
Ineffective
Fairness, Group harm
Effectiveness:
Moderate.
Fairness
Effectiveness:
Moderate.

An immediate and striking feature that is evident from Chart 4 is
that the current responses to attenuation in the legal sphere have been
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limited, ineffective, or non-existent. This is particularly problematic
given the importance of a strong legal case if reparations is to have any
chance of succeeding.
The current situation for reparations is thus precarious. Little
progress has been made in the courts, due to the continued inability to
avoid legal attenuation concerns. The lack of progress in the courts
means that governments and corporations feel little pressure or threat
that a judgment will be rendered against them.121 This lack of pressure
allows the government and private actors to dismiss reparations claims
in the public and legislative spheres. Since there is no pressure created
by litigation, governments need not view reparations as “serious.”122
It is crucial to resolve causation and attenuation concerns quickly
because the attenuation problem is not going to get better. Attenuation
is a losing battle of attrition for reparations advocates, because every
day, slavery becomes more attenuated. If reparations advocates cannot
move the litigation forward quickly, they run the risk of being trapped
in a quagmire, and never advancing past Stage One.
C. Preliminary Notes on Addressing Attenuation
Before moving on to some specific legal ideas for addressing
attenuation, we will go over some preliminary points that will inform
our discussion. First, not all sub-types of attenuation are equally
121

Cf. Hylton, Slavery, supra note 22, at 1 (“Like all lawsuits, this one has the
power to force one’s attention.”). In this sense, the courts act as gatekeepers, and
screen out reparations proposals that are unworthy of attention.
122
The end goal for most litigants in the modern court system is to reach a
settlement. See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverd, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts
in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 2-3 (1996) (noting that most
law suits filed in America settle, and most of the remainder are dismissed); Peter H.
Scheck, The Role of the Judge in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange
Example, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 337, 337 (1986) (noting that most cases settle before
trial); Mark Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and
Regulation of Settlements, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1339 (1994) (discussing phenomenon
and perception of settlement).

39

CAUSATION AND ATTENUATION

important. At the present, a particularly important concern is victim
attenuation in the legal sphere. This is the concern which has blocked
the advancement of reparations cases in the courts. Thus, the most
important task right now is addressing legal victim attenuation.123
Other concerns are on the horizon. For example, moral concerns
about wrongdoer attenuation may be an important hurdle for
settlement. Reparations advocates must address both legal arguments,
in order to present a colorable claim which payers wish to settle, and
moral arguments, so that a settlement is politically feasible.124
Second, reparations advocates should be aware of how their
arguments relate to the broad distributive versus corrective justice
concerns. Some arguments against attenuation may imply a move
away from corrective and towards distributive justice. This may
weaken the case for bringing reparations under the tort banner, and
suggest that like other distributive justice devices they should be
legislated.125 But such a settlement will be most likely if a viable legal
case puts pressure on payers to settle. Thus, it is important to use the
tools of corrective justice, the tort system, to create the pressure that
may ultimately lead to a remedy from the legislature, which may look
more like distributive justice. To the extent that attenuation concerns
undercut the corrective justice argument, they must be addressed, but
not in a way that moves the discussion completely away from
corrective justice.
123

As noted earlier, the legal concerns of victim and act attenuation are closely
related. The victim attenuation concern of standing is related to an inability of
current claimants to show harm. To the extent that plaintiffs show harm, they may
address both victim and act attenuation concerns.
124
Cf. Brophy, Taking Reparations Seriously, supra note 34, at 39-41
(discussing the need for a politically palatable reparations plan); Yamamoto, supra
note 47, at 479-96 (discussing the political element in reparations).
125
Cf. Richard Epstein, The Case Against Black Reparations, __ B.U. L. Rev.
__, *9 (2004) (“Why think of the claim as one for reparations when the program
looks far more like some legislative initiative that does not have to observe the
standard constraints of corrective justice, but simply has to command sufficient
political support to pass.”).
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I will use the remainder of the Article to discuss conceptual and
theoretical tools which can address attenuation, in particular legal
concerns of victim attenuation. This priority is because victim
attenuation is the most pressing concern at present, and must be
addressed in order to move past the current roadblock. Part III will
discuss what may be the best option for addressing legal concerns of
victim attenuation: The use of causation tools developed in the mass
tort context.
Following that discussion, I will give some preliminary ideas on
next steps in developing conceptual theories of causation and
responsibility that allow reparations to be accepted by legislatures and
the public. A full analysis and rebuttal of all of the moral and legal
issues of attenuation is beyond the scope of this Article. In particular,
moral concerns and concerns of act and wrongdoer attenuation will
necessarily remain underdeveloped within this Article. However, the
discussion should provide useful analysis for addressing other types of
attenuation.
III. Using the Tools of Mass Torts to Address Attenuation in
the Courts
It is very surprising that, despite the profound analogy between
attenuation and similar concerns that come up in mass tort, reparations
advocates have not employed the theoretical tools from the mass tort
context. Courts and scholars have addressed complicated issues of
causation in the mass tort context. Indeed, slavery itself can be viewed
as one of the earliest mass torts.
In this Part, I will explore the analogy between reparations and
mass torts. I do this as follows. Section A will discuss some of the
issues of causation that arise in the mass tort context. Section B will
examine similarities between causation issues in mass torts and in
reparations. Section C will discuss some solutions that have emerged
in the mass tort context, both theoretical and practical, and will discuss
how these apply to reparations.
A. Problems of Causation in Mass Torts
41

CAUSATION AND ATTENUATION

It is not unusual for a tort to have more than one potential cause.126
Courts often deal with cases where it is not possible to know whether a
defendant’s act would have led to the injury or whether other
intervening factors would have prevented an injury. It is similarly
impossible in many instances to know whether a defendant’s taking
precautions would have prevented an injury. The problem is that a
single event may be logically traceable to more than one cause,
meaning that each cause individually is underdeterminative.
Underdetermination is caused by the inability to know which of
potential competing causes contributed to a harm.127 For example, if a
sailor falls off of a ship and drowns, and the ship did not maintain
adequate safeguards, it may be impossible to know if the safety
measures would have saved the sailor.128 The sailor may have been
swept overboard despite the precautions; the cause of his death is
underdetermined.
Underdetermination arises often in the mass tort context. Mass
torts typically involve a large number of plaintiffs harmed by a
defendant’s product. Where the harm manifests in a physical disease
126

Every effect has multiple causes. Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Causein-Fact, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 60, 62 (1956); see also Wright, supra note 7, at 1737 (noting
that there are innumerable causes for each injury); id. at 1780-85 (discussing tort
scholarship about multiple causes); Glen O. Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort
Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 Va. L. Rev. 713, 713-14 (causation is vague
and manipulable, more than a simple question of fact, and actual cause involves
policy questions just as proximate cause does).
127
See Aaron Twerski & Anthony J. Sebok, Liability Without Cause? Further
Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact as Applied to Handgun Liability, 32 Conn. L. Rev.
1379, 1380 (2000) (“The problem was one of underdetermination. The reason we
don’t know if the defendant’s breach of duty caused the injury is because we don’t
know whether the victim was in a position to benefit from the increase in safety that
the duty was supposed to guarantee.”); see also Malone, supra note 126, at 65
(stating that the process of determining causation is often “basically conjecture”); see
generally Michael Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language (1981) (discussing the
conceptual idea of underdetermination).
128
Malone, supra note 126, at 76.

42

CAUSATION AND ATTENUATION

that can have many causes, underdetermination is common, and
showing conventional causation can be difficult.129 As Margaret
Berger notes, harms for which plaintiffs seek compensation may be
“found in others who have not been exposed to the substance or
product in question.” Thus, “it is impossible to tell whether an
individual plaintiff’s injury is attributable to the product or whether it
would have manifested itself anyhow.”130 This difficulty results from
the number of causes that can contribute to a disease; as another
commentator notes, “rarely is any particular toxic agent the exclusive
source of a given disease. Insidious diseases generally have several
sources, each of which may be sufficient to bring about the
condition.”131
Judge Weinstein, in the Agent Orange case, was faced with a
complex problem of underdetermination. He noted that it was quite
possible that no particular plaintiff would be able to trace her injuries
to a particular defendant, and that only statistics would show any harm
at all. He illustrated such a scenario:
Let us assume that there are 10 manufacturers and a
population of 10 million persons exposed to their product.
Assume that among this population 1,000 cancers of a
129

See Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a
New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 2117, 2123 (1997)
(“None of these categories of evidence is capable, however, of proving conclusively
a cause and effect relationship . . . Evidence of this kind is inherently subject to
considerable uncertainty and inconclusiveness.”); Steve Gold, Note, Causation in
Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, Standards of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96
Yale L.J. 376, 380 (1986).
130
Id. at 2121-22; see also Gold, supra note 129, at 376 (“Proving the cause of
injuries that remain latent for years, are associated with diverse risk factors, and
occur at background levels even without any apparent cause, is the central problem
for toxic tort plaintiffs.”).
131
Rosenberg, supra note 103, at 856; see also Jack B. Weinstein, Individual
Justice in Mass Tort Litigation (1995) (discussing this problem); Robinson, supra
note 126, at 759 (stating that a deterministic causation approach that assumes a clean
relation between an act and the injury is not useful in indeterminate cases which
require probabilistic evidence).
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certain type could be expected, but that 1,100 exist, and
that this increase is “statistically significant,” permitting a
reasonable conclusion that 100 cancers are due to the
product of the manufacturers.132
In such a case, Weinstein recognized, “no plaintiff can show that
his or her cancer was caused by any one of the defendants.”133 The
Agent Orange case was a clear instance of the underdetermined
causation that is so common in mass torts. Similar concerns have
dogged lawsuits seeking compensation for harm caused by products
such as tobacco, asbestos, and DES.
These concerns were also particularly acute in the DES
litigation.134 DES was a drug which was used widely over a twentyfour year period, until it was found to cause reproductive illness in
children of pregnant women who took the drug.135 DES was
manufactured by a variety of companies, and many different types of
DES tablets, made by different manufacturers, were interchanged
freely.136 They were fungible products. Not only was it difficult to
determine whether plaintiffs’ injury arose from DES; it was also
difficult to trace the harm to any particular defendant.137 In most
cases, claims were brought by daughters of women who ingested DES.
In some cases, claims were brought by granddaughters of the women
as well.138 There may be no area of law where underdetermination has
been more closely examined than mass torts.
B. The Reparations Analogy
132

In re “Agent Orange” Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 837 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
Id.
134
See Richard M. Russell, Note, The Causation Requirement: Guardian of
Fairness or Obstacle to Justice? Making Sense of a Decade of DES Litigation, 25
Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1071, 1080-81 (1991).
135
See generally Robinson, supra note 126, at 713-17.
136
Id. at 722-26.
137
Id.
138
See generally John B. Maynard, Note, Third-Generation-DES Claims, 27
New Eng. L. Rev. 241, 285 (1992).
133
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Using the terminology developed in Part II of this Article, we can
see how underdetermination relates to the previously examined
categories of attenuation. It is evident that the problems of
underdetermination that affect mass torts have much in common with
the attenuation difficulties that plague reparations lawsuits. Mass torts
present the same concerns of victim, wrongdoer and act attenuation.
In both cases the real problem is the same. There is a potential
connection between claimants and payers, but it is of undeterminable
strength. It is hard to match the victim to the wrongdoer, and to match
the parties to the harm.
In fact, many mass tort issues could be reframed, using the
categories of attenuation we have previously discussed. For example,
the problems of tracing a particular cancer to a defendant’s product are
created by act attenuation. The problem of identifying a culpable
defendant from among a pool who have manufactured fungible
products in a large market is a problem of wrongdoer attenuation. And
the problem of connecting a harm to children and grandchildren of the
originally harmed party — the so-called “DES granddaughters” — are
problems of victim attenuation. In addition, the causation problem
related to the victim attenuation concern of standing.

45

CAUSATION AND ATTENUATION

Chart 5: Mass Tort Issues as Mapped onto Attenuation Grid
Wrongdoer Attenuation Tracing harm to a specific tortfeasor139
Victim Attenuation
Tracing harm to later victims; DES
granddaughters; causation issues leading to
standing concerns
Act Attenuation
Linking harm to defendants
As in the mass tort context, the harm to modern slave descendants
caused by of slavery is of underdetermined causation. Like the case of
ships and safeguards, like in the case of DES granddaughters or Agent
Orange veterans, we cannot know if a defendant’s alternate choice not
to enslave would have resulted in greater assets being given to any
particular slave descendant. Since reparations presents a problem
analogous to mass torts, it is helpful to see how courts have addressed
these issues in the mass torts context.
C. Solving the Underdetermination Problem
Tort law in general, and mass torts in particular, has developed
means of dealing with underdetermination. While underdetermination
complicates the legal questions of causation, it does not altogether rule
out a finding of legal causation. This Section will discuss how tort law
handles underdetermination: Section 1 will discuss theoretical
background, and Section 2 will discuss the use of statistical evidence.
Sec tion 3 will then apply these ideas to the problems of act, victim,
and wrongdoer attenuation.
1. Conceptualizing Recovery in Underdetermined Cases
139

Also, issues of wrongdoer attenuation may arise in addressing successor
liability for damages. See generally Michael D. Green, Successor Liability: The
Superiority of Statutory Reform to Protect Products Liability Claimants, 72 Cornell
L. Rev. 17 (1986) (discussing theoretical successor liability issues).

46

CAUSATION AND ATTENUATION

This Section will examine some conceptual and theoretical tools
used in underdetermined cases. Two important ideas are loss of
chance and burden shifting. Following a discussion of those concepts,
as well as some general considerations, this Section will discuss how
these have been used in mass tort cases.
a. Loss of Chance
The tort system allows recovery in some underdetermined cases.140
A useful example is the imposition of liability for those ships that did
not adequately protect against being washed overboard. In a wellknown law review article, Wex Malone studied these cases and found
that courts moved from a policy of not imposing liability to a policy of
imposing liability nearly all of the time.141 Significantly, courts were
willing to impose liability despite the conceptual difficulty of not
knowing whether the victim would have been in a position to benefit
from the increase in safety.142 “It would be futile for the courts to
recognize a duty to provide emergency equipment and to impose an
obligation to proceed promptly to the rescue if the defendant could
always seize upon the uncertainty which nearly always attends the
rescue operation as a reason for dismissing the claim,” noted
Malone.143
Tort scholars have suggested various theoretical approaches
explaining why courts should allow liability even where causation is
underdetermined. Wex Malone refers to many of these cases as
involving the loss of a “gambler’s chance.”144 In such cases, a
140

See Twerski & Sebok, supra note 127, at 1381; Malone, supra note 126, at

72-73.
141

Malone, supra note 126, at 75-77.
Twerski & Sebok, supra note 127, at 1380; Gray, supra note 8, at 97-100 &
n.18 (discussing cases).
143
Malone, supra note 126, at 75-77.
144
Id. at 80; see also Twerski & Sebok, supra note 127, at 1381. The loss of
the gambler’s chance can be a significant loss; in many instances, without a
defendant’s actions, “some value would have been preserved.” Malone, supra note
126, at 80.
142

47

CAUSATION AND ATTENUATION

defendant facilitates the realization of an independently created risk.145
Courts are not always willing to find liability in gambler’s chance
cases, however, and are most willing to find liability in cases where a
defendant had notice of a potential harm.146 Similarly, courts are more
willing to find liability where defendants violated a rule “designed to
protect” against the harm that in fact occurred.147 The gambler’s
chance lost by slave descendants is likely to be quite substantial. 148
b. Burden Shifting and Other Factors
A second technique is to shift the burden of proof.149 After all, in
many underdetermined cases, it can be impossible to show either
causation or non-causation. Courts may shift the burden to defendants,
as the court chose to in Summers v. Tice, the classic case involving a
hunting accident where it was impossible to determine which of two
negligent shooters had caused the injury.150 The court held that
“practical justice” allowed the burden to shift to defendants, to
establish that they were not the cause of harm.151 Some courts have
applied similar reasoning in the mass tort litigation over DES.
145

Twerski & Sebok, supra note 127, at 1383. See also id. at 1383-84 (giving
examples); Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DePaul L. Rev. 435, 439-48 (1999).
146
Twerski & Sebok, supra note 127, at 1385-86.
147
Malone, supra note 126, at 72.
148
Hylton, Slavery, supra note 22, at 39, suggests that descendants might have
an approximately forty percent chance of inheriting excess wealth from four
generations removed. Id. at 39.
149
Robinson, supra note 126, at 721-26; Gray, supra note 8, at 117-18
(discussing burden shifting).
150
Id. at 715; 33 Cal. 2d 80, 86-88 (1948). The court ruled that both hunters
could be held liable. Id.; see also Malone, supra note 126, at 83 (stating that the
court was unwilling to let “two wrongdoers pass the ball”); Keeton et al., supra note
8, at 271 (“It seems a very desirable solution where negligence on the part of both
defendants is very clear, and it is only the issue of causation which is in doubt, so
that the choice must be made between letting the loss due to failure of proof fall on
the innocent plaintiff or the culpable defendants.”); Gray, supra note 8, at 102-04
(same).
151
33 Cal. 2d 80, 86-88 (1948).
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c. Other General Considerations
Scholars have suggested that courts are most likely to find liability
in cases where causation is underdetermined if certain other factors are
present. For example, courts are more willing to find liability if the
tort is an intentional tort, or if its harm is easily foreseeable.152 Courts
may reject cases where the chance of harm is particularly low.153 And
they may be likely to find liability where a party engaged in
particularly noxious acts.154
Courts may apply the “substantial factor” test, allowing liability in
cases where a defendant’s actions were a substantial factor leading to
the plaintiff’s harm.155 A defendant’s actions will be considered a
substantial factor in causing a harm if they “satisf[y] the but-for test
(with an exception for simultaneous independent sufficient causes)
[and are] an appreciable and continuously effective or efficient factor
in producing the harm, up to the time of occurrence of the harm.”156
The substantial factor test allows courts to decide whether there is
close enough affinity for the law to intervene and label a defendant’s
conduct “wrong.”157

152

Twerski & Sebok, supra note 127, at 1381; Malone, supra note 126, at 73,

85-87.
153

See Twerski & Sebok, supra note 127, at 1387 (noting that the lower the
probability that defendant’s act was not a cause, the higher the probability of a court
imposing liability); see also id. at 1387-90 (discussing the difficulty of dealing with
low probabilities in a world of full compensation). The conceptual problem is that a
court may be faced with two unpleasant choices: either to overdeter, or to allow
defendants to escape liability entirely. Id.
154
See id. at 1386 (suggesting that the very production of handguns carries
culpability); Rabin, supra note 145, at 453 (noting that handguns are designed for a
dangerous purpose).
155
Malone, supra note 126, at 89-95 (discussing the substantial factor test).
156
Wright, supra note 7, at 1781-82; see also Robinson, supra note 126, at 751
(noting that the substantial factor test is similar to the but-for test). One benefit of the
substantial factor test is that it prevents minor causes from creating liability. Id. at
715-16.
157
Malone, supra note 126, at 72.
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d. Application in Mass Tort Context
Courts have applied loss of chance and burden shifting to allow
recovery in mass tort cases. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories used
burden shifting, holding defendant DES manufacturers liable unless
they could show that they did not cause plaintiffs’ harm.158 The court
held that since multiple actors contributed to the harm, and causation
was not individually traceable, all of the potential contributors could
be held responsible.159 Sindell has been called “modified Summers”
case because it allowed defendants to pay in proportion to the harm
they caused.160 The court adopted reasoning similar to Summers,
noting that “as between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants,
the latter should bear the cost of the injury.”161 Another DES court
noted in a similar vein:
There have been several approaches in tort law
available to a plaintiff confronted with more than one
actor who could be the causation in fact. In such
instances where each such party acted independently
but tortiously and it is proved that injury has been
caused to plaintiff by only one of them, but there is
uncertainty as to which one caused it, and where each
can be joined as a defendant in the case, some courts
have shifted the burden of proof of causation in fact to
the defendants.162
That court also found that since defendants had acted in a similar
manner, and were aware of the possibility of harm, they could be held
liable, even if the harm could not be directly traced to one particular
158

Id. at 717; see 26 Cal. 3d 588, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). The court
opted to make the DES manufacturers show that they did not cause the injury, rather
than making the victims show causation. Robinson, supra note 126, at 714-15. The
court adopted this position in part because it was easier for defendants to maintain
the kind of data that could be used to either show, or disprove, causation. Id. at 734.
159
Id. at 729.
160
Gray, supra note 8, at 105-06.
161
26 Cal. 3d at 610-11.
162
Bichler v. Eli Lilly and Co., 79 A.D.2d 317, 324-25 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
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defendant.163 Other DES courts have also adopted some version of
group liability.164 This is similar to the idea of “enterprise liability,”
which was applied in other mass tort settings to find that all actors in
an industry are liable for foreseeable harms.165
On DES granddaughters, courts have divided in those cases, with
some courts allowing DES granddaughters to pursue claims against the
DES manufacturers, and other courts barring these claims.166 The
burden shifting used by some DES courts is dispositive, since typically
defendants are as unable to disprove causation as plaintiffs are unable
to prove it.167
Another useful analysis of causation can be found in the district
court opinion in Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, which dealt with a class action
suit against handgun manufacturers for the harms cause by negligent
distribution of handguns.168 In that opinion — which was later
reversed on other grounds169 — the district court found causation
despite some misgivings about underdetermination. The judge noted
163

Id. at 325-26.
See, e.g., Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166 (1984); see generally
Robert A. Baruch Bush, Between Two Worlds: The Shift from Individual to Group
Responsibility in the Law of Causation of Injury, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 1473, 1483 -97
(1986) (discussing several DES cases). This development was also rejected by some
courts. See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Laboratories, 386, Mass. 540 (1982).
165
See, e.g., Hall v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 353
(E.D.N.Y. 1972).
166
See id. at 251-61 (discussing cases); DeMayo v. Schmitt, No. 625, 1989
Phila. Cty. Rptr. LEXIS 73, at *1 (C.P. Philadelphia County Dec. 28, 1989)
(allowing claim for negligence to be stated); Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 570 N.E. 2d
198 (N.Y. 1991) (claim could not proceed because of preconception tort doctrine);
McMahon v. Eli Lilly & Co., 774 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1985) (permitting third
generation claim); Bowe v. Abbott Laboratories, 608 N.E. 2d 223 (Ill. App. 1992);
Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 591 N.E. 2d 696 (Ohio 1992) (denying recovery); see
generally Julie A. Greenberg, Reconceptualizing Preconception Torts, 64 Tenn. L.
Rev. 315, 320-28 (discussing the cases).
167
Robinson, supra note 126, at 729.
168
Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F.Supp.2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), rev’d on other
grounds, 264 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2001).
169
264 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2001).
164
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that the defendants’ conduct was a “significant contributing factor in
the development” of the ultimate harm.170 The evidence, wrote the
court,
was sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to conclude
that the negligent marketing and distribution of
handguns by manufacturers was a substantial factor in
the promotion and development of an underground
illegal market supplying New York criminals, and thus
increasing the probability of death or serious injury [to
plaintiffs].171
This decision has been critiqued;172 indeed it is no longer good
law. However, its causation analysis appears to ask the right questions
to determine whether liability can be found despite
underdetermination. The court asks whether a defendants’ conduct
was a “significant contributing factor in the development” of a harm or
“a substantial factor . . . increasing the probability” of plaintiffs’
harm.173 The underlying inquiry, as suggested by commentators, is “if
defendants had behaved differently, how many fewer plaintiffs would
have been harmed?”174
2. Use of Statistical Evidence to Show Causation
Faced with a variety of difficulties in showing causation in mass
tort cases, advocates, scholars, and courts have developed methods for
showing causation through statistical evidence. Scholars have argued
that a “probabilistic approach to causation” is proper in cases where a
large number of plaintiffs have been harmed by a group of defendants,
170

Id. at 838.
Id. On the jury’s role in assessing punishment, see generally Kaimipono
David Wenger & David A. Hoffman, Nullificatory Juries, 2003 Wisc. L. Rev. 1115,
1148-56.
172
See Twerski & Sebok, supra note 127, at 1400.
173
62 F.Supp.2d at 838.
174
Twerski & Sebok, supra note 127, at 1403-04.
171

52

CAUSATION AND ATTENUATION

and where intervening causation is possible, resulting in inability to
definitely trace any individual plaintiff’s injury to an individual
defendant’s actions.175 In these cases, scholars suggest that the amount
recovered should be based on a “probability of causation” for a
defendant.176
In Agent Orange, Judge Weinstein suggested that plaintiffs would
divide any recovery to reflect the statistical increase in likelihood of
harm they suffered.177 He applied statistical causation, and used a type
of proportional liability in allocating damages following the Agent

175

Robinson, supra note 126, at 759-60; Gold, supra note 129, at 384 (noting
that mass tort cases rarely involve particularistic evidence); Wendy Wagner, Note,
Trans-Science in Torts, 96 Yale L.J. 428, 433 n.28 (collecting cases); Mario J. Rizzo
& Frank S. Arnold, Causal Apportionment in the Law of Torts: An Economic
Theory, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1399 (1980) (advocating the use of probabilistic
causation in multiple cause cases).
176
Id. at 749-66; see also Bush, supra note 164, at 1490-92; Jack B. Weinstein
and Robert Kushen, Scientific Evidence in Complex Litigation, C-607 ALI-ABA
Course of Study, July 24, 1991, at 709, 724 (“Statistical data may . . . permit
combinations of anecdotal and valid statistical data to prove guilt or establish some
material proposition of fact.”); but cf. Wright, supra note 7, at 1827 (suggesting that
such devices may result in the tort system becoming more of a wealth redistribution
system and less of a corrective justice system, and that such a change would be
unfortunate).
177
The court wrote:
Let us assume that there are 10 manufacturers and a population of
10 million persons exposed to their product. Assume that among
this population 1,000 cancers of a certain type could be expected,
but that 1,100 exist, and that this increase is “statistically
significant,” permitting a reasonable conclusion that 100 cancers
are due to the product of the manufacturers. In the absence of
other evidence, it might be argued that as to any one of the 1,100
there is only a chance of about 9% (100/1100) that the product
caused the cancer. . . . Since no plaintiff can show that his or her
cancer was caused by any one of the defendants, they should
divide the $100,000,000 by 1,100, giving each a recovery of about
$90,000.
Id. at 838-39.
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Orange settlement.178 Statistical, pro rata distribution of damages was
used because of the problem of indeterminate defendants and
indeterminate plaintiffs.179 Recognizing the relative novelty of this
approach, the judge wrote: “We are in a different world of proof than
that of the archetypical smoking gun. We must make the best estimates
of probability that we can using the help of experts such as statisticians
and our own common sense and experience with the real universe.”180
Statistical causation in mass tort cases is generally shown by the
use of epidemiological studies. These are used to “determine whether
there is a statistical association between defendant’s product and
plaintiff’s disease by comparing the incidence of disease in those
exposed to defendant’s product with the disease’s background rate.”181
Epidemiology is the branch of medical science that employs integrated

178

In re Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984);
see also Peter H. Schuck, Agent Orange on Trial (1986) (describing trial and
resolution, including process of arriving at settlement).
179
Id. at 840-43. The court later wrote that causation could not be established
to allow liability. See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223,
1229 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (granting summary judgment to defendants against plaintiffs
who had opted out of certified class, since plaintiffs could not show a “causal link
between exposure to Agent Orange and the various diseases from which they are
allegedly suffering”), aff’d, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987); In re “Agent Orange” Prod.
Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (also granting summary judgment
against an opt-out plaintiff), aff’d, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987).
180
Id. at 838; see also In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litigation,
52 F.3d 1124, 1131 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Causation in toxic torts normally comprises two
separate inquiries: whether the epidemiological or other scientific evidence
establishes a causal link between c (asbestos exposure) and d (colon cancer), and
whether plaintiff is within the class of persons to which inferences from the general
causation evidence should be applied.”); Rosenberg, supra note 103, at 859-60
(advocating proportional liability for defendants “in proportion to the probability of
causation of harm” to the plaintiff class members). But cf. Wright, supra note 7, at
1822-23 (arguing that mere statistics, even when based on causal generalizations,
cannot adequately show legal causation).
181
Berger, supra note 129, at 2125-26; see also Gold, supra note 129, at 384
(discussing phenomena of increased risk and enhanced probability of harm).
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use of statistics to “to identify and establish the causes of human
diseases.”182 As one writer notes:
The hallmark of epidemiology is that it is based on the
study of populations, not individuals. It seeks to
establish associations between alleged causes and
effects by one of two methods: either comparing the
incidence of disease across exposed and unexposed
populations, or comparing the incidence of exposure
across sick and healthy populations. With proper
scientific interpretation, these correlations lend great
weight to an inference of causation.183
3. Application to Attenuation in Reparations
The same tools used in the mass tort context can be used to address
legal attenuation concerns in reparations. We will examine each type
of attenuation here.
a. Act Attenuation
Overcoming act attenuation requires showing a link between the
harm done to slaves and the harm to modern slave descendants. As in
the mass tort context, this link can be shown using statistical tools.
This would require some coordination, including running a rigorous
and controlled statistical study prior to bringing suit. 184
The basic design of a study to demonstrate causation would
probably be along these lines: The alleged harm is poverty; it should
be possible to establish whether or not poverty has a higher incidence
182

See generally Bert Black & David E. Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in
Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 732, 736 (1984).
183
Gold, supra note 129, at 380.
184
Cf. Twerski & Sebok, supra note 127, at 1404, 1409 (suggesting that novel
cases particularly benefit from the use of statistical data). Of course, such a study
may be complex and difficult to perform. See Berger, supra note 129, at 2127-28
(noting the difficulty of conducting epidemiological studies).
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among slave descendants than among the general populace. It can be
established that slave descendants currently hold some value, X.
Applying statistical tools, it may be possible to show that they would
have held some greater amount, X + Y. The premise seems likely,
given the well-known economic disparities between Blacks and
members of other races.185 The reasoning would go (to adapt the
language previously used by Judge Weinstein in the Agent Orange
litigation):
Let us assume . . . a population of 10 million persons
exposed to [slave descent]. Assume that among this
population 1,000 [instances of poverty] could be expected,
but that 1,100 exist, and that this increase is “statistically
significant,” permitting a reasonable conclusion that 100
[instances of poverty] are due to the [slave descent].186
Such analysis can put a solid number on the question of how slaves’
lost property and lost wages affect Blacks today.
Reparations advocates can also point to existing cases to suggest
that slavery is the type of harm where liability is appropriate despite
underdetermination.
The harms inflicted under slavery were
intentional, not negligent, which is one indicator of potential
liability.187 The harm, against slaves and their children, was also
foreseeable, another potential indicator of liability.188 The very act of
slavery carries an “air of culpability” which some commentators
suggest is another indicator of liability.189 Other factors also weigh in

185

See supra note 40 (noting these statistics).
In re “Agent Orange” Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 837 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
187
Twerski & Sebok, supra note 127, at 1385-86.
188
Id. (foreseeability of harm).
189
Id.; see also Wenger, supra note 1, at 202 n.34 (noting argument that slavery
was a violation of natural law); Randy E. Barnett, Essay, Was Slavery
Unconstitutional Before the Thirteenth Amendment?: Lysander Spooner’s Theory of
Interpretation, 28 Pac. L.J. 977, 988-1014 (1997).
186
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favor of liability: Slaves were subjected to inhuman treatment,190 and
an argument can be made that slavery was a valueless act.191
b. Victim Attenuation
Because of the relation between the legal concerns of act and
victim attenuation in reparations, statistical causation concepts that
address act attenuation can also address victim attenuation. As noted
by the Slave Descendants court, the victim attenuation concern is
whether claimants can establish a concrete harm. Use of statistical
evidence can demonstrate that concrete harm, overcoming one
importanthurdle for repar ations.
The conceptual underpinning for overcoming victim attenuation is
simple enough. It is certainly true, as the Slave Descendants court
notes, that any number of eventualities could have deprived plaintiffs
of receiving economic benefits from their ancestors. The plaintiffs’
ancestors may have chosen to spend their wealth on themselves192 or
donate it to charity. They may have chosen to give it to certain
favored children, and plaintiffs’ particular lines of parentage might
have been unrepresented. Even if plaintiffs’ ancestors had fully
intended to pass on their wealth, they may have been unable to do so.
They may have needed assets to deal with daily expenses or
emergencies, and had no money to pass on. They may have been poor
money managers, losing their assets in unwise investment.193 They
may have been victims of the many financial uncertainties that the
190

See Malone, supra note 126, at 95 (noting that “inhuman treatment” was a
factor in court finding causation).
191
See id. at 86 (noting that courts are more likely to find causation if harmful
act is not valuable to society); but cf. Wenger, supra note 1, at 238-40 (noting the
economic value of slavery to the country).
192
This is a reasonable possibility. There is no indication that plaintiffs intend
to pass on parts of any recovery to their descendants, rather than simply consuming
it. See also Hylton, Slavery, supra note 22, at 39 (“Precariousness would have given
the slave a strong incentive to spend his money on his own desires right away.”).
193
See id. (“The problem that remains is the passage of time, which allows for
many opportunities for money to be squandered or used in other ways.”).
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country has seen, losing money to market crashes, business
competition, changing laws, wars, speculation, financial panics,
currency fluctuation, and inflation.
Every one of these is a possibility. And yet, it is also possible that
these ancestors, had they been paid for their labor, would have passed
down some amount of wealth, which would have eventually come to
the plaintiffs.194 This is not an unrealistic scenario either; many
Americans enjoy some measure of inherited wealth.195 It is unrealistic
to suggest that none of the slave descendants would have received
inherited wealth. The question is, what is the statistical likelihood of
receiving wealth that was lost to slave descendants?196
194

And, as with other tort cases, the supposed breaks in the causal chain of
harm to slave descendants are not particularly debilitating. In particular, the court is
concerned that it cannot verify that slave ancestors would have given their assets to
their descendants. This concern is overstated. Giving assets to one’s children is a
common course of action. If the court were applying the doctrine of cy pres to
decide where a party’s assets were to go, a natural destination would be a decedent’s
descendants. A similar principle, applied here, shows how strained the Slave
Descendants court’s reasoning is. In the absence of a will, what would slaves most
likely have likely wanted done with their assets? They most likely would have
wanted them to go to their children. Hylton, Slavery, supra note 22, at 39 (“In order
to avoid reducing damages to descendants for a reason that was not only beyond the
slave’s control but a foreseeable consequence of the initial injury, we should assume
that if paid, he would have passed the money on at the same rate as parents in
conventional families do.”). But cf. Waldron, supra note 16, at 10 (noting
“whimsical” nature of property disposition).
195
See generally Thomas M. Shapiro, The Hidden Cost of Being AfricanAmerican: How Wealth Perpetuates Inequality (2004) (discussing transfer of wealth
between generations).
196
Showing the statistical likelihood of inheritance answers the recurring
critique that the amount of compensation is not calculable. See Epstein, supra note
125, at 9 (“We have no idea of how much of that profit (assuming that it could be
calibrated) actually descended to the next generation. The ordinary business will
reinvest some share of its profits, but will declare some as dividends and pay some
out in salaries to its employees. Any dividends and wages do not descend to the next
generation.”); Massey, supra note 9, at 164-65 (“It is impossible to know how much
better off today’s black Americans would be, if at all. It is even more speculative to
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To answer this, plaintiffs will need to show the statistical
likelihood of present claimants receiving inheritance from slave
ancestors, as well as the likely amount of any inheritance. This
number should be calculable. Armed with such a number plaintiffs
can assert to a judge that they are not merely showing a genealogical
relationship; by depriving their ancestors of compensation, slave
owners deprived the slaves’ descendants of a statistically measurable
sum.197 Despite the possibility of intervening causes, plaintiffs have
some statistically measurable, non-negligible chance of being the
recipients of their ancestors’ wealth.198 (And it is almost certain that
reparations defendants could not establish that they were not the cause
of plaintiffs’ injuries.)
This could establish concrete harm and show standing. Allowing
statistical evidence to address the weak act attenuation concerns that
lead to victim attenuation resolves the concerns of the Slave
Descendants court. The court expresses concern that the plaintiffs’
ancestors assets may have been dispersed due to intervening events.
This is not an unreasonable concern, and is conceptually similar to the
possibility of another factor leading to a tort claimant’s disease. In
both cases, it is appropriate to use statistics.

try pinning a number on the loss suffered by any given contemporary individual
descendant of American slavery.”).
197
This number may be smaller than commentators assume. Indeed, economic
studies suggest that, absent the presence of legal regimes to preserve wealth, it is
difficult to keep fortunes together. See generally John F. Hart, “A Less Proportion of
Idle Proprieters”: Madison, Property Rights, and the Abolition of Fee Tail, 58 Wash.
& Lee L. Rev. 167 (2001) (discussing the effect of fee tail and primogeniture in
preserving wealth between generations). Ironically, Blacks missed out on many of
the devices, such as fee tail and primogeniture, designed to maintain wealth. Thus,
principles of corrective justice suggest that they should be given the benefit of every
doubt on whether they would have kept wealth and passed it on to future generations.
198
Of course, the question might be complicated by the potential need for a
Daubert-approved statistical model in order to show standing.
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c. Wrongdoer Attenuation
Finally, the framework set out in Sindell and other DES cases
provides a means of overcoming wrongdoer attenuation. In Sindell,
the court found that DES manufacturers could be held liable despite
the inability of plaintiffs to connect directly the manufacturers to the
plaintiffs’ harm. That court noted, “as between an innocent plaintiff
and negligent defendants, the latter should bear the cost of injury.”199
Similar reasoning applies in reparations.
Of course, there is a potential problem with applying the Sindell
reasoning. In Sindell, tortfeasors comprising a large majority of the
market were joined.200 Sindell used proportional liability, allocating
liability between the defendants in proportion to their market share.201
In the reparations context, it may be difficult to apply Sindell since
there are no dominant producers of slavery. One possibility would be
to join government actors. Another would be to let plaintiffs use the
“enterprise liability” theories where any actors in an enterprise can be
found liable for harms it causes.202
D. Recap
This Part has examined the idea of causation. It is apparent that
legal attenuation critiques, including the Slave Descendants court’s
199

26 Cal.3d at 610-11.
Id. at 611-12 (noting that joined defendants comprised 90 percent of the
DES market).
201
Id. at 612-13.
202
It is possible to argue that causal chains to wrongdoers may have been
broken by natural acts of wealth disbursement. However, cases have established that
torts from a third party will not break the causal chain. Robert L. Rabin, Enabling
Torts, 49 DePaul L. Rev. 435, 439-48 (1999). Some courts have found actors liable
for financing the purchase of a car by a party likely to drive unsafely, dropping off a
passenger in a dangerous neighborhood, or leaving a car parked, with keys in the
ignition, in a neighborhood where it is likely to be stolen and cause damage. Id. at
438-41. If case law allows causation to be found for “enabling” acts even where a
tortious act by a third party is required to bring the harm to fruition then it seems
like, a priori, an “enabling” act that allows harm to occur by the passage of normal,
non-tortious acts of wealth disbursement should be actionable.
200
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analysis, are oversimplified. The question of causation in reparations
requires analysis of underdetermined causation, which does not always
preclude liability. Slavery is a good candidate for liability despite
underdetermined causation. And reparations advocates should use the
tools of mass tort, particularly statistical causation, to establish
liability.
Statistical tools may be used to show harm to modern
claimants, resolving legal concerns of victim and act attenuation. And
conceptual tools used in the DES and other cases can be used to
address wrongdoer attenuation.
Use of mass tort tools is an application of a legal solution to the
legal attenuation concerns. Most importantly, on a strategic level, this
analysis provides a means of potentially overcoming victim
attenuation at the legal level. As discussed above, that is a necessary
step for moving forward with reparations. Mass tort tools also provide
means of dealing with other legal attenuation objections to reparations.
Conclusion: Filling in the Gaps
Earlier in this Article, we discussed some strategic considerations.
The Article suggested that reparations litigation was stalled at a
dangerous point, and that it was crucial to get past the judicial
gatekeepers to the next stages of public discourse and, eventually,
settlement.
These strategic considerations remain paramount. Reparations
advocates must address attenuation, and they must do so effectively,
meeting moral argument with moral and legal with legal, addressing
each of the three major attenuation arguments. The need to address
legal arguments relating to victim attenuation is foremost.
This Article has suggested that many attenuation concerns can be
addressed by looking to the mass tort jurisprudence and literature, and
has set out some basic ideas which could be used as a framework in
adapting the mass tort theory to reparations. Recall that, as previously
set out in Chart 3, there are gaps in the responses to attenuation. Those
gaps were previously mapped:
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Repeat of Chart 3: Responses to Attenuation.

Wrongdoer
Attenuation
Victim
Attenuation
Act
Attenuation

Legal Response
Suits against government and
corporations.
None

Moral Response
None (possibly group
benefit)
Fairness, Group harm

None (possibly social research)

Fairness

This Article has worked to fill these gaps. I have suggested that
statistical causation may provide a means of avoiding the problems of
victim and act attenuation in the legal sphere. I have also suggested
that Sindell harm contribution analysis may be used to address legal
concerns of wrongdoer attenuation. These advances modify the chart
as follows:
Chart 6: Modified Catalog of Responses to Attenuation

Wrongdoer
Attenuation
Victim
Attenuation

Act
Attenuation

Legal Response
Suits against government and
corporations. Sindell harm
contribution analysis.
Lack of harm (standing)
concerns addressed by
showing harm through
statistical means, as in mass
torts.
Possibly social research.
Statistical proof may also
show causation

Moral Response
None (possibly group
harm)
Fairness, Group harm

Fairness

Much remains to be done. Reparations advocates must test the
statistical causation arguments to see if they satisfy courts’ lack of
harm and standing concerns. The argument should be further
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developed and refined for use in showing causation at trial, ultimately
addressing act attenuation concerns that arise at that stage. And the
Sindell harm contribution analysis should be employed as needed to
address wrongdoer attenuation. Despite the work that remains to be
done, this Article shows that there is a theoretical foundation for
addressing attenuation.
Throughout this Article, I have employed the terminology of legal
arguments and moral arguments. But in the final analysis, the lines are
a little more blurred. Many so-called legal arguments are, at their
core, based on moral policy decisions.203 Legal arguments are moral,
but they are a special subset of moral arguments, and the legal
critiques of reparations must be given a legal response.
Some reparations advocates suggest that they cannot win at law,
and that it is therefore necessary to employ moral arguments, rather
than legal arguments. In this Article, I take the opposite tack. I agree
that the end resolution will likely be outside of court, but what seems
to be needed right now is a legal hook to move the debate forward.
Therefore, I have proposed a technical framework that should aid in
carrying forward the moral argument.
Of course, once reparations cases have demonstrated some chance
of success in courts, reparations advocates must still advance a
politically feasible case for settlement. The time to begin to lay the
groundwork for this is now. This Article has not examined potential
solutions for the moral concerns of attenuation. However, I will set
203

Proximate cause is a legal creation, designed to cut off liability at a rather
arbitrary point. As such, it has been criticized. For example, scholars writing about
the history of the legal requirement of causation note that it arose from cases
involving damage caused by railroad sparks, and courts perceived a need to preserve
capitalism. Mari Matsuda, On Causation, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 2195, 2200 (2000).
Thus, the existing rules of causation seeks stable, objective, and predictable
outcomes, id. at 2201, and in the process serve to protect class interests, id. at 2202.
Proximate cause is a policy choice. Other, alternative choices exist. See id. at 2195,
2211 (suggesting that under current rules, those least able to correct a wrong are
often considered its cause, and that causation should be expanded to cover other
parties who have the ability to avoid or prevent a harm).
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out a few preliminary thoughts. It is my hope to generate discussion
about these ideas and to encourage the airing of other thoughts on how
to address attenuation in the public discourse.
First, reparations advocates can focus on the idea of tainted
property. This argument would characterize modern citizens as
innocent recipients of tainted property — their possession of tainted
property may not be their fault, but they may still be responsible for
recompensing the harm caused. A second tactic is strengthening the
historical research as well as establishing genealogical ties to slave
ancestors for individual Blacks today. This is necessary given the
recurrence of ideas of victim attenuation. A related concern is the
further development of reparations plans, and in particular the tailoring
programs to those who have been harmed.204 Reparations advocates
may be able to avoid victim and act attenuation through the use of
reparations plans can specifically target harmed slave descendants.
One way to ameliorate resentment and wrongdoer attenuation is to
place the burden on the widest possible segment of society, thus
creating the least possible burden for any one payer.205 To this end,
reparations programs should be broad in scope, and may seek to
extend payment over a period of time. Reparations advocates may
suggest the development of ideas for administrative solutions to the
distribution of reparations.206 The widely accepted success of
programs such as the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund
might provide a model, as well as support for administrative
distribution programs.207 Similarly, they can discuss the generational
problem, and point out that, in cases of grave wrongdoing such as the
204

Brophy, Taking Reparations Seriously, supra note 34, at 31.
Brophy, Taking Reparations Seriously, supra note 34, at 39.
206
Jack B. Weinstein, Compensation for Mass Private Delicts: Evolving Roles
of Administrative, Criminal, and Tort Law, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 947, 971-74 (2001)
(noting the ability of administrative bodies to assist in distributing payment for mass
delicts).
207
This might involve further examination of the corrective and distributive
justice questions previously discussed.
205
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Holocaust, the passage of time did not dilute moral responsibility.
These ideas — and doubtless many others — can be developed by
scholars as a next step to addressing moral concerns of attenuation.208
Given the difficulty in advancing reparations suits and proposed
bills, it makes sense to explore legal and moral theories which can be
used to explain and advocate reparations to judges, legislatures, and
the public. This Article has delineated between different types of
attenuation in the reparations context. It has discussed how ideas of
statistical causation from the mass tort context may be used in the
reparations debate. It has also briefly sketched some ideas that could
be developed to further address moral attenuation concerns. By
examining the nuances of the questions of causation and attenuation, it
demonstrates the possibility of showing causation in reparations.
Indeed, it turns out that attenuation, like other concerns about
reparations, may provide “grist for the mill of reparations critics, but
[is] familiar in law, and the law has developed methods for dealing
with (or ignoring) [it].”209

208

See also Brophy, Cultural War, supra note 3, at 1188.
See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 13, at 702 (making this statement about
potential problems in determining compensation amounts and in making any
distribution of restitution).
209
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